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SUMMARY TABLE 
 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Output (Real Annual Growth %) 
     
Private Consumer Expenditure 4.0 1.6 3.0 2.3 2.2 
Public Net Current Expenditure 3.5 3.9 6.4 6.5 5.3 
Investment 51.7 -31.0 9.8 7.5 8.0 
Exports 4.4 7.8 8.9 4.3 4.4 
Imports 18.5 -9.4 7.0 6.3 6.1 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 5.0 7.2 6.7 3.8 3.2 
Gross National Product (GNP) 11.5 4.4 5.9 3.4 3.0 
      
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
     
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.4 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 2.5 1.5 3.0 3.2 3.4 
      
Labour Market 
     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,132 2,194 2,250 2,307 2,356 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 195 158 145 126 120 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 8.4 6.7 5.7 5.2 4.8 
      
Public Finance 
     
General Government Balance (€bn) -1.5 -0.8 0.4 -0.9 -1.5 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -0.5 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 73.4 68.4 64.7 63.1 58.3 
      
External Trade 
     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -11.4 24.9 29.0 17.0 12.1 
Current Account (% of GNP) -5.1 10.7 11.5 6.5 4.4 
 
Note:  Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2018 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 99.9 104.3 4.4 1.4 3.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 29.6 32.0 8.1 1.5 6.4 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 69.0 79.4 15.1 4.8 9.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 383.8 8.9 0.0 8.9 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.5 1.6 
   
Final Demand 554.6 601.1 8.4 0.9 7.4 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  263.3 316.7 8.7 1.0 7.7 
Statistical Discrepancy 2.8 1.8 
   
GDP at Market Prices 294.1 318.5 8.3 1.5 6.7 
Net Factor Payments  -61.0 -66.6 
   
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 251.8 8.0 1.9 5.9 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.5 3.8 0.3 9.4 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 85.7 90.7 5.0 5.9 
Other 113.3 118.3 5.0 4.4 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.0 0.2 
  
Statistical Discrepancy -2.8 -3.0 
  
Net Domestic Product 250.6 271.9 21.3 8.5 
Net Factor Payments -61.0 -66.6 -5.7 9.3 
National Income 189.6 205.2 15.6 8.2 
Depreciation 72.0 74.8 2.8 3.9 
GNP at Factor Cost 261.6 280.0 18.4 7.0 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.4 -28.2 0.3 -1.0 
GNP at Market Prices 233.1 251.8 18.7 8.0 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
  
 
2017 2018 Change in 2018 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 89.3 99.5 10.2 
F -59.8 -65.4 -5.6 
Net Transfers -4.6 -5.1 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 24.9 29.0 4.1 
as % of GNP 10.7 11.5 
1 
1.6 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2019 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 104.3 108.5 4.0 1.7 2.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 32.0 35.3 10.5 3.8 6.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 79.4 87.4 10.0 2.4 7.5 
Exports of Goods and Services 383.8 404.7 5.4 1.1 4.3 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.6 3.0 
   
Final Demand 601.1 638.9 6.3 1.6 4.6 
less: 
     
Imports of Goods and Services  284.4 306.3 7.7 1.3 6.3 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 318.5 332.4 4.4 0.5 3.8 
Net Factor Payments  -66.6 -71.0 
   
GNP at Market Prices 251.8 261.4 3.8 0.4 3.4 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.8 3.9 0.1 2.6 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 90.7 96.2 5.5 6.1 
Other 118.3 123.3 4.9 4.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.2 0.2 
 
 
Statistical Discrepancy -3.0 -3.0   
Net Domestic Product 271.9 284.0 12.1 4.5 
Net Factor Payments -66.6 -71.0 -4.4 6.5 
National Income 205.2 213.0 7.8 3.8 
Depreciation 74.8 77.5 2.7 3.6 
GNP at Factor Cost 280.0 290.5 10.5 3.7 
Taxes less Subsidies -28.2 -29.0 -0.9 3.1 
GNP at Market Prices 251.8 261.4 9.6 3.8 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2018 2019 Change in 2019 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 99.5 98.3 -1.2 
F -65.4 -75.6 -10.3 
Net Transfers -5.1 -5.6 -0.6   
Balance on Current Account 29.0 17.0 -12.0 
as % of GNP 11.5 6.5 -4.6 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2020 
A: EXPENDITURE ON GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 108.5 113.0 4.1 1.9 2.2 
Public Net Current Expenditure 35.3 37.6 6.5 1.1 5.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 87.4 97.3 11.3 2.5 8.0 
Exports of Goods and Services 404.7 427.5 5.6 1.5 4.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 3.0 3.0 
   
Final Demand 638.9 678.4 6.2 2.0 4.5 
less:    
   
Imports of Goods and Services  306.3 329.8 7.7 1.7 6.1 
Statistical Discrepancy -0.1 -0.1 
   
GDP at Market Prices 332.4 348.4 4.8 1.9 3.2 
Net Factor Payments  -71.0 -74.5 
   
GNP at Market Prices 261.4 274.0 4.8 1.6 3.0 
 
B: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ORIGIN 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture, Self Employed Income 3.9 4.0 0.1 2.6 
Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 
Non-Agriculture, Employee Remunerations 96.2 101.7 5.4 5.6 
Other 123.3 128.4 5.1 4.1 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.2 0.2 
  
Statistical Discrepancy -3.0 -3.0 
  
Net Domestic Product 284.0 298.1 14.1 5.0 
Net Factor Payments -71.0 -74.5 -3.5 4.9 
National Income 213.0 223.7 10.7 5.0 
Depreciation 77.5 80.1 2.6 3.4 
GNP at Factor Cost 290.5 303.7 13.3 4.6 
Taxes less Subsidies -29.0 -29.8 -0.8 2.6 
GNP at Market Prices 261.4 274.0 12.5 4.8 
 
C: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
 
2019 2020 Change in 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X – M 98.3 97.6 -0.7 
F -75.6 -79.4 -3.7 
Net Transfers -5.6 -6.1 -0.5   
Balance on Current Account 17.0 12.1 -4.9 
as % of GNP 6.5 4.4 -1.8 
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The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview 
 
2018 saw the Irish economy register another sizeable increase in activity with 
GDP estimated to have risen by 6.7 per cent. While some of this increase is due to 
the disproportionate activities of a select number of multinational firms, the 
underlying performance of the economy is still remarkably strong. Increases in 
taxation receipts, even aside from corporation taxes and the ongoing dynamic 
performance of the labour market, are compelling evidence of this. 
 
However, the present year has seen international sources of growth cool; the 
underlying weaknesses in the Chinese economy along with the deterioration in 
the trade relationship between the US and China have contributed to a reduction 
in the global outlook. The recovery in the Euro Area has also stalled somewhat. 
Inevitably, this will impact on the domestic economy, with the contribution of the 
trade balance to growth set to decline. These developments have led us to revise 
downwards our forecast of real GDP growth in 2019 from 4.2 per cent in the 
previous Winter Commentary to 3.8 per cent for 2019. It should be noted that all 
forecasts in the Commentary, unless otherwise stated, assume that the United 
Kingdom remains a member of the European Union. 
 
The importance of Brexit for the Irish economy has seen the Department of 
Finance commission a joint research project with the ESRI to examine various 
different Brexit scenarios using COSMO – the structural model of the Irish 
economy. Other empirical work completed by researchers at the Institute 
(Lawless, 2016a; Lawless, 2016b; Lawless and Morgenroth, 2018)1 examining the 
Brexit issue from a microeconomic persective has also been used in this exercise. 
The results of this analysis, which are published in a paper with the Commentary 
(Bergin et al., 2019), are used in the Commentary to examine the implications for 
the short-run growth outlook of the different scenarios. Therefore, like the 
previous Commentary, we produce a baseline set of forecasts under a no-Brexit 
scenario and complement this with a set of forecasts associated with certain 
Brexit outcomes.  
 
Overall, this results in a baseline real GDP forecast of 3.8 per cent for the Irish 
economy in 2019 and 3.4 per cent in 2020. However, under a no-deal exit for the 
 
                                                          
 
1  Lawless, M. (2016a). Intermediate goods inputs and the UK content of Irish goods exports, Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI). 
Lawless, M. (2016b). ‘Irish-UK Services Trade and Brexit’, Working Paper No. WP595, Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI).  
Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth (2018). ‘Brexit and Irish Consumers’, Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Article, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
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UK with significant disruptions, Irish GDP is expected to grow by just 1.2 per cent 
in 2019 and 2.5 per cent in 2020. 
 
In the medium term, another challenge to the Irish economy is the prospect of 
monetary policy normalisation at the Eurozone level. In a Special Article to the 
present Commentary, Fahy et al. (2019), using micro-level data, examine the 
impact of a rise in ECB policy rates on the Irish mortgage market. Their findings 
illustrate that the mortgage market is more resilient than in the past and better 
able to withstand shocks. However, interest rate rises would affect certain 
cohorts of the Irish mortgage market.  
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The International Economy 
 
The global economy appears poised for continued but slower growth in 2019 and 
2020, however there are significant downside risks. Negotiations around the US-
China trade dispute have intensified in Q1 2019, although no increases in tariff 
rates have, as yet, materialised. Furthermore, the Chinese economy is showing 
additional signs of economic uncertainty coming mainly through lower activity in 
the housing market and increased concern about domestic lending practices. 
These uncertainties have been incorporated into the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook as of January 2019, which revised world output growth down from 3.7 in 
its October issue to 3.5 per cent for 2019.2 From a domestic perspective, these 
broad-based declines in growth rates across large economies suggest a 
weakening of global demand for Irish exports. 
 
The European Union continues to display signs of an economic slowdown. 
According to preliminary estimates of year-on-year real GDP growth, economic 
activity among the EU28 fell from 1.8 per cent in Q3 2018 to 1.4 per cent Q4 
2018. Using the same seasonally adjusted measure, France, Germany and Italy 
experienced a 0.9, 0.6 and 0.1 per cent annual rise in real GDP, respectively, in Q4 
2018. This is a clear sign of deteriorating economic conditions in the Euro Area. 
However, the European labour market remains robust: as of December 2018, 
EU28 unemployment fell to 6.6 per cent, ranging from a low of 2.1 per cent in the 
Czech Republic to a high of 18.5 per cent in Greece. The ECB has ended its asset 
purchases programme as of January 2019 and recently announced that rate hikes 
are off the table until 2020 at least due to recent weakness in economic 
performance. Inflation in the Euro Area averaged 2.0 per cent in Q4 2018, though 
price increases have moderated in the first months of 2019.  
 
This slowdown in the Euro Area has led a number of commentators to query the 
underlying strength of the European recovery. Whelan (2018) suggests that the 
recovery to date is cyclical in nature and the recent sluggishness reflects 
underlying weak productivity growth and demographic factors.3 The combination 
of these issues is likely to result in slow average growth rates for the Euro Area in 
the coming decades. Amongst the many other implications of this trend, Whelan 
(2018) notes that slower future growth rates are likely to lead to the ECB setting 
lower interest rates in the future which are likely to be lower than average rates 
during the pre-crisis era. With Irish growth rates set to exceed those of the Euro 
 
                                                          
 
2  International Monetary Fund (2019). World Economic Outlook: A Weakening Global Expansion, Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, January 2019. 
3  Whelan, K. (2018). ‘Monetary Policy in an Era of Low Average Growth Rates’, Monetary Dialogue November 2018,  
Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union (European Parliament). 
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Area over the short to medium term, domestic policymakers cannot expect 
monetary policy at the European level to ‘lean against the wind’ in terms of 
cooling demand-side pressures in the Irish economy. In this context, the use of 
countercyclical tools for both fiscal policy and macro-prudential policy will be 
critical in preventing any overheating which may occur. 
 
As highlighted in Figure 1, real GDP growth in the UK had been trending 
downwards since well before the EU withdrawal referendum. Using measures of 
gross value added as a proxy for monthly changes in GDP, the ONS has 
highlighted a sudden loss of activity in both the production and manufacturing 
sectors. In Q4 2018, production contracted by 1 per cent while manufacturing 
contracted by 1.5 per cent relative to the same period last year. However, 
unemployment has continued to remain low throughout the year and is 
estimated to be 4.0 per cent in December 2018. 
 
FIGURE 1 KEY UK ECONOMIC INDICATORS, YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE (%) 
  
 
Sources:  ONS, gross domestic product, percentage change, latest quarter on corresponding quarter of previous year (LHS); ONS, monthly 
GDP based on GVA (Gross Value Added), percentage change, latest three months on same three months a year ago (RHS). 
 
As the key withdrawal date of 29 March approaches, much of the impact of Brexit 
already experienced by the UK economy has centred on exchange rate 
developments and slowdowns in investment activity. Between Q2 2016 and 
Q4 2018, the Pound lost 11.3 per cent of its value against the Euro. As displayed 
in Figure 2, the real economy experienced a broad-based disinvestment in Q4 
2018. Among UK financial institutions, historically high levels of disinvestment 
have resulted in a net outflow of £26 billion worth of assets across the first three 
quarters of 2018. While developments in the real economy and financial markets 
are not always entirely correlated, both items appear to signal the recent 
manifestation of major uncertainty. 
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FIGURE 2 UK BUSINESS INVESTMENT YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH (%) AND UK FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION NET INVESTMENT (£ BILLION) 
  
 
Source:  ONS, Business investment real-time database (LHS), ONS, Investment by insurance companies, pension funds and trusts (RHS). 
Note: *Net investment for 2018 captures the first three quarters of 2018 and hence is not an annual figure.  
 
As Breinlich et al. (2019) conclude, signs of UK firms offshoring production to the 
EU are already present and can be expected to accelerate should there be 
increased barriers to trade and migration introduced in April 2019.4 A number of 
studies have assessed the long-term effects of Brexit on the UK economy; 
predictions for a ‘soft’ Brexit in the form of a free trade agreement averages a 
3.7 per cent fall in GDP relative to the baseline scenario of ‘remain’, whereas a 
‘hard’ Brexit involving defaulting to WTO tariff rates averages a 6.0 per cent 
decline (Bergin et al., 2019). Given the uncertainty around Brexit, the ESRI 
undertook joint research with the Department of Finance to consider the 
economic implications of different Brexit scenarios. These are summarised in a 
paper included in the Commentary and the impacts for the short-term forecasts 
of the Irish economy are summarised in Box 1.5 
 
The US economy grew at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent in Q3 2018. Personal 
consumption contributed 2.7 percentage points towards this increase. As of 
October 2018, the US unemployment rate declined to 3.7 per cent. Growth rates 
in Q4 2018 and Q1 2019 are expected to be slightly weakened by the recent 
government shutdown. Estimates indicate this is likely to amount to a 0.65 
percentage point reduction in economic growth in Q1 2019.6 As was widely 
anticipated, the Federal Reserve raised the official US interest rate to a range of 
 
                                                          
 
4  Breinlich, H., E. Leromain, D. Novy and T. Sampson (2019). ‘Voting with their Money: Brexit and Outward Investment 
by UK Firms’, Centre for Economic Performance, the London School of Economics and Political Science.  
5  Bergin, A., P. Economides, A. Garcia-Rodriguez and G. Murphy (2019). ‘Ireland and Brexit: modelling the impact of 
deal and no-deal scenarios’, Quarterly Economic Commentary Spring 2019, Special Article.   
6  According to the White House Council of Economic Advisors, each week of the shutdown was estimated to result in a 
0.13 percentage point reduction in quarterly economic growth. This shutdown saw a record high of 35 days in length.  
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2.25 to 2.5 per cent in December 2018. Given the US treasury yield curve’s tepid 
response to ongoing monetary policy measures, balance sheet reductions of 
$50 billion in securities are expected to continue with less frequent adjustments 
being made to the official interest rate.  
 
The trade balance for the US weakened in the latter half of 2018, with a 4 per 
cent year-on-year decline in goods exports and a 7 per cent increase in goods 
imports. Between January and November, the overall US trade deficit in 2018 
increased by 9 per cent relative to the same period last year. Following the 
implementation of bilateral trade tariffs with China between July and September, 
Figure 3 highlights a significant decline in US exports contributing to this trade 
balance effect. These frictions in US-China trade have contributed to an 11 per 
cent rise in the trade deficit between January and November of 2018 relative to 
the same period last year. 
 
FIGURE 3 US-CHINA SEASONALLY ADJUSTED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, Y-O-Y GROWTH (%) 
 
Source:  United States Census Bureau, US Export and Import data for goods. 
 
Real GDP in China grew year-on-year by 6.6 per cent in 2018, down from 6.8 per 
cent in 2017. Though the risk of increased tariff rates has been postponed, the 
economy is still struggling to cope with the burden of imposed restrictions both 
on the banking system and housing market.7 As previously noted in the Winter 
Commentary, the moderation observed in Chinese real estate prices in recent 
 
                                                          
 
7  In October 2018, the Reserve Bank of Australia’s Financial Stability Review noted that these policy measures have 
attempted to reduce indirect lending in the non-bank sector, simplify complex interconnections within the financial 
system, and reduce high levels of corporate leverage. 
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months comes as price caps on new apartments and limitations on the resale of 
real estate purchases are introduced.  
 
Real GDP in Japan remained flat year-on-year for Q4 2018, following further 
declines in net exports and private residential investment. As of August 2018, 
final estimates suggest there has been a 9.1 per cent decline in the size of the 
working population over the past ten years. Among others factors, this lessens 
the prospect of sustained growth in Japan. With gaps continuing to widen in the 
labour market, there are now an estimated 16 jobs available for every ten 
individuals seeking employment. Unemployment remains fixed at 2.3 per cent 
while weak economic activity has resulted in persistently low inflation. 
 
Developments in oil prices 
As displayed in Figure 4, trends in global oil prices reversed following October 
2018. Between this period and January 2019, average oil prices have fallen by 
approximately 27 per cent for both Brent crude and WTI crude. This is likely the 
result of a slowdown in global demand and continued increases in US shale-oil 
production over the past year. OPEC has responded to such trends by requesting 
cutbacks in oil production among members. Though the majority of members 
have not adhered to such cutbacks, continued low levels of supply from Angola 
and Venezuela are allowing OPEC to meet targets on an aggregate level. Non-
OPEC members however, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, have responded by 
increasing production to near record levels. From an Irish perspective, given the 
economic reliance on imported fossil fuels, low oil prices may lead to an extended 
period of low inflation and lower pressures on household expenses.  
 
FIGURE 4 CRUDE OIL PRICES, NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ($ PER BARREL) 
 
Sources:  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Figure 5 summarises the forecasts for GDP growth produced by the major 
institutions of their respective economies. Each forecast for 2018 signals minimum 
and maximum forecasts with point values identifying the median of forecasts. 
These forecasts signal a broad-based expectation of a moderation in economic 
growth across the majority of developed economies.  
 
FIGURE 5 REAL GDP GROWTH (% CHANGE, YEAR-ON-YEAR) 
 Euro Area     United States     United Kingdom 
  
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRISH EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Goods  
Trade continues to drive economic growth in the Irish economy. As denoted in 
Figure 6, goods trade in Q4 2018 saw exports grow at an annual rate of 7.9 per 
cent while imports increased by 23.3 per cent. Over the past four quarters, for 
every €1 worth of goods imported to Ireland, the economy exported €2.33 worth 
of goods. 
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FIGURE 6 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN TOTAL IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
Note: Export and Import growth rates feature on the LHS whereas € million changes in trade are highlighted by the RHS. 
 
While these traded goods are owned by Irish resident firms, some of these goods 
may never physically cross the Irish border. When examining the trade of goods, 
foreign-owned Irish resident firm activities such as processing and merchanting 
must be taken into account.8 Cross-border trade captured through monthly 
merchandise-related trade statistics excludes the trade of ownership goods (e.g. 
contract manufacturing, merchanting). Comparing cross-border trade with the 
overall trade of goods enhances understanding of domestic exporter activity.9 
 
In Q4 2018, seasonally adjusted cross-border imports of goods increased by 15 
per cent relative to the same period the previous year. Exports increased by 22 
per cent, driven largely by continued growth in demand for medicinal and 
pharmaceutical products. Figure 7 highlights significant contributions to the trade 
balance leading to an annual increase in the trade surplus of 26 per cent 
(€10.4 billion) in 2018. 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  ‘Goods for processing’ is dominated by ‘Contract Manufacturing’, a process in which multinational companies 
residing in Ireland issue contracts to foreign firms to produce goods. Although these goods never enter the Irish 
economy, due to ownership of these goods pertaining to Irish resident firms, sales are recorded as an Irish export.  
‘Merchanting’ consists of the buying and selling of completed goods abroad which at no stage enter or leave Ireland.  
9  For further details on ownership trade, see CSO document ‘Explaining Goods Exports and Imports 2012-2016’. 
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FIGURE 7 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN CROSS-BORDER IRISH EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
However, as displayed in Table 1, exports have declined in the Food industry, in 
Machinery and transport equipment and for commodities related to Animal and 
vegetable oils, fats and waxes. The overall improvement in exports of 
€17.8 billion was largely due to the €18 billion improvement in the export of 
Chemicals and related products. Excluding such products results in residual 
exports declining between 2017 and 2018 by 0.3 per cent.  
 
TABLE 1 ANNUAL CHANGE IN IRISH EXPORTS BY COMMODITY  
 
2017 2018 €bn  % Change 
Net Exports of Cross Border Goods 122.8 140.6 17.8 14 
 Food and live animals 11.4 11.1 -0.3 -2 
 Beverages and tobacco 1.4 1.4 0.1 5 
 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 1.8 1.9 0.1 6 
 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 1.0 1.2 0.2 21 
 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.1 0.1 0.0 -28 
 Chemicals and related products 67.8 85.8 18.0 26 
 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 2.3 2.3 0.0 1 
 Machinery and transport equipment 21.2 19.8 -1.4 -6 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 14.9 15.7 0.8 6 
 Other items 1.0 1.1 0.1 18 
Net Exports less Chemical Products 54.9 54.7 -0.1 -0.3 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and QEC author calculations. 
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Given the vulnerability of the domestic agricultural sector to Brexit, it is worth 
examining trade in this sector in more detail. Figure 8 splits food trade into two 
major sub-components. In mid-2017, a spike in exports of dairy and egg products 
occurred, likely due to CAP quota changes. Given this large increase in exports in 
overall food exports in 2017, it is difficult to ascertain how strongly recent 
uncertainty to do with Brexit has impacted the agri-food sector. Examining food 
on a country basis, both the UK and EU contributed towards modest growth in 
Irish food exports whereas remainder of the world’s demand for Irish food 
exports declined in value by 15.2 per cent between 2017 and 2018. 
  
FIGURE 8 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN CROSS-BORDER FOOD EXPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The various components of cross-border trade are not available on a seasonally 
adjusted basis. In Q4 2018, total cross-border imports of goods by this measure 
rose year-on-year by 18.2 per cent (15.0 per cent when seasonally adjusted). 
Between 2017 and 2018, Machinery and transport equipment products and 
Chemicals products represented 42 and 22 per cent of total imports, respectively. 
Machinery imports increased by 7 per cent and Chemicals by 13 per cent for the 
same period. 
 
Relative to 2017, Ireland’s trade deficit with the UK increased by 35 per cent to 
€4.3 billion. While trade in chemical products with the UK fell significantly, 
imports from Europe and exports to the US have grown by 82 per cent and 39 per 
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cent, respectively. These, among other improvements, have caused Ireland’s 
trade surplus with the EU27 to increase by €1.7 billion while the surplus with the 
US increased by €6.4 billion (89 per cent of the overall trade surplus). Table 2 
details changes in exports and imports between Ireland and other trading regions 
in 2018. 
 
TABLE 2 JANUARY-DECEMBER ANNUAL CHANGE (%) IN GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS  
 
Exports 
% of Total 
Exports 
Imports 
% of Total 
Imports 
Total – UK -3 10 5 20 
 Food and live animals 2 3 5 4 
 Chemicals and related products -15 3 -12 3 
 Machinery and transport equipment -7 2 8 4 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 5 1 4 3 
Total – Rest of EU 18 40 23 40 
 Food and live animals 3 3 6 4 
 Chemicals and related products 31 26 82 11 
 Machinery and transport equipment -12 5 10 18 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 5 4 4 2 
Total – US 18 28 -4 18 
 Food and live animals -34 < 1 26 < 1 
 Chemicals and related products 39 20 -42 4 
 Machinery and transport equipment -40 2 19 11 
 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 7 <1 0 1 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Services 
Services imports continue to outpace exports in Q4 2018. This resulted in a 
negative trade balance contribution for services of €3.6 billion. Relative to the 
same period last year, imports of services increased by 20 per cent while exports 
of services increased by 13 per cent.  
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FIGURE 9 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) IN IRISH SERVICE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Exports of computer services accounted for 46 per cent of total service exports in 
Q4 2018, increasing by 29.1 per cent relative to the same period last year. 
Royalties and licenses and business services formed 76 per cent of services 
imports in Q3 2018. These components experienced annual growth in Q4 2018 of 
17.8 and 14.4 per cent respectively, as reflected in Figure 10. As a component of 
‘business services’, imports of research and development services experienced 
the largest annual increase, rising by 120 per cent in Q4 2018 relative to the same 
period last year.  
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FIGURE 10 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Trade Balance 
The value of goods and service exports in Q4 2018 increased at an annual rate of 
9.3 per cent to €101 billion while imports increased by 22.3 per cent to 
€84 billion. This resulted in a €17 billion contribution to the Irish trade surplus, 
accounting for 21 per cent of nominal GDP in Q4 2018. Comparing cross-border 
trade with National Accounts data reveals estimates of ownership trade in the 
overall trade balance. Figure 11 highlights these differences, facilitating the 
assessment of domestic trade activity and Ireland’s international competitiveness 
over the past ten years. Due to the inclusion of ownership trade, a domestic trade 
surplus in Q4 2018 of €8 billion increases to €23 billion.  
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FIGURE 11 CROSS-BORDER AND ADJUSTED NET EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES (€ MILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, QEC calculations. 
Note: Adjustment to net trade accounts for ownership trade of goods. This includes, but is not limited to, forms of goods for 
processing such as contract manufacturing, and merchanting, i.e. purchase and resale of goods which do not enter the 
merchant’s economy.  
 
Due to the volatile nature of ownership trade in goods as well as services, 
forecasts in the Commentary continue to be based on trends in trade patterns 
linked to underlying Irish economic activity. Consequently, we expect export 
growth of 4.3 per cent and 4.4 per cent in 2019 and 2020 respectively. Imports 
are expected to increase by 7.5 per cent in 2019 and 8 per cent the following 
year. The year-end current account is expected to reach €17 billion (6.5 per cent 
of GNP) in 2019 before falling somewhat to €12.1 billion (4.4 per cent of GNP) in 
2020.  
 
Given the uncertainty concerning Brexit, based on the results in Bergin et al. 
(2019), we present different a range of forecasts for the short-term trade outlook 
for the Irish economy in Box 1, Table B.10  
  
 
                                                          
 
10  Bergin, A., P. Economides, A. Garcia-Rodriguez and G. Murphy (2019). ‘Ireland and Brexit: modelling the impact of 
deal and no-deal scenarios’, Quarterly Economic Commentary Spring 2019, Special Article.   
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
The domestic section of the Commentary is organised as follows; we initially 
review the outlook for output growth before discussing developments in the Irish 
monetary and financial sectors as well as developments in inflation. Demand-side 
factors such as consumption and housing market issues are then discussed. On 
the supply side, we then examine developments in investment and the labour 
market before concluding with an analysis of the public finances. 
 
Given the ongoing uncertainty concerning the impact of Brexit on the Irish 
economy, the Department of Finance worked with researchers at the ESRI to 
examine the issue in some detail. This was mainly accomplished through use of 
COSMO – a structural model of the Irish economy. However, other empirical work 
by researchers at the Institute was also used. The results are presented in a paper 
to the present Commentary (Bergin et al., 2019). In Box 1, we use this work to 
assess the implications for the short-term growth rate of the economy under 
certain Brexit scenarios 
 
BOX 1  A REASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT BREXIT TYPE SCENARIOS ON THE 
SHORT-TERM FORECAST OF THE IRISH ECONOMY 
As a significant body of work has been recently completed by researchers in the ESRI 
examining the potential impact of Brexit on the Irish economy, in this Box we update the 
analysis presented in the last Commentary. Therefore, we examine the implications for 
the short-run outlook of the Irish economy of different Brexit scenarios. In Bergin et al. 
(2019) the specifics of the scenarios are outlined in detail. These scenarios are compared 
with a baseline scenario where the UK is assumed to remain part of the European Union. 
The Brexit scenarios include two ‘no-deal’ scenarios where the UK is assumed to trade on 
WTO terms with the EU from 1 April 2019. One such scenario assumes that the transition 
to this arrangement occurs in an orderly manner through the use of emergency 
provisions while the other scenario assumes that a significantly greater degree of 
disruption occurs (‘Disorderly No-Deal’). This greater degree of disruption is modelled 
through the use of additional non-tariff measures (NTMs). It must be noted the research 
does not take into consideration other non-trade disruptions such as financial market 
distress that may occur following a disorderly Brexit nor does it address the potential 
indirect frictions that intra-EU trade could experience when passing through the UK 
landbridge.  
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Similar to previous exercises, the COSMO model links to an international network of 
models – in particular ‘NiGEM’ at the National Institute for Economic Research (NIESR) in 
the UK. However, the exercise also draws on more detailed micro-level research 
conducted on the Brexit issue in Lawless and Morgenroth (2016), Lawless (2018a) and 
Lawless (2018b). This work supplements the macro-level analysis with detailed 
information on the trading relationships between Ireland and the UK and between both 
countries and the rest of the EU. 
Along with the two different ‘no-deal’ scenarios presented in Bergin et al. (2019), one 
scenario is based on the intended outcome of the Withdrawal Agreement achieved 
between the EU and the British Government in late 2018. The Withdrawal Agreement 
assumes a transition period of effective EU membership in the short run between the UK 
and the EU before a free trade agreement is established thereafter.  
Table A summarises the impacts on the domestic economy of the different scenarios 
over the next ten years. These impacts are measured as percentage deviations from a 
baseline scenario where the UK continues to remain a member of the European Union. 
This impact of deviations from the baseline scenario is greatest in the case of ‘no-deal’ 
outcomes. In COSMO, the shock is transmitted to the Irish economy through the traded 
sector. Overall, in all cases there is a significant reduction in foreign demand which 
lowers the volume of output in the traded sector and exports over the medium to long-
run below their baseline values. This fall in output results in labour demand being below 
the baseline level, which leads to lower employment and higher unemployment rates. 
TABLE A  THE IMPACTS OF BREXIT ON THE IRISH ECONOMY OVER THE LONG TERM  
(TEN YEARS LATER) 
Scenario % Deviation from Baseline GDP 
Withdrawal Agreement (FTA) -2.6 
No-Deal -4.8 
Disorderly No-Deal -5.0 
 
By ten years, the results are almost identical under both ‘no-deal’ scenarios; this is 
because the main difference between both scenarios has to do with disruptions over the 
progression to WTO trade arrangements in the short term. These differences have mostly 
dissipated by 2027. In both cases real Irish GDP is down by approximately 5 per cent 
relative to the baseline. In contrast, the Withdrawal Agreement results in Irish output 
levels being 2.6 per cent below the baseline level for the same period. 
In the short run, current trading arrangements between the EU and the UK continue 
under the Withdrawal Agreement; this means that the full impact of the scenario is only 
felt by the Irish economy over the next ten years when the UK is assumed to have 
negotiated a trade deal with the EU. Therefore, we focus on the impacts of the 
‘Disorderly No-Deal’ as this poses the most significant challenge to the Irish economy.  
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As with the results in the last Commentary, these longer-term results from the 
econometric analysis are now related to shorter-term forecasts of the Irish economy.  
Initially, we focus on the implications of the results in Bergin et al. (2019) on the short-
run forecasts of trade activity in the Irish economy. Table B presents forecasted rates of 
growth in exports and imports under the various Brexit scenarios.  
TABLE B  THE IMPACTS OF BREXIT ON THE SHORTER-TERM COMMENTARY TRADE FORECASTS 
Scenario 2019 2020 
Baseline   
 Exports 4.3 4.4 
 Imports 6.3 6.1 
No-Deal   
 Exports 3.6 2.5 
 Imports 5.8 4.3 
Disorderly No-Deal   
 Exports 0.9 3.1 
 Imports 3.5 4.6 
 
Under the status quo of continued UK membership, the Commentary anticipates 4.3 per 
cent export growth in 2019 and 4.4 per cent growth in 2020. For imports of goods and 
services, a 6.3 per cent rise is expected in 2019 followed by a 6.1 per cent increase in 
2020. Under a ‘No-Deal’ scenario, exports are now estimated to grow by 3.6 per cent in 
2019 and 2.5 in 2020. Imports are forecasted to grow by 5.8 per cent in 2019 and 4.3 per 
cent in 2020. Under a ‘Disorderly No-Deal’ scenario, exports only increase by 0.9 per cent 
in 2019 and 3.1 per cent in 2020. Imports would grow by 3.5 and 4.6 per cent in 2019 and 
2020 respectively, under such a scenario. It should be acknowledged that greater orders 
of disruption could occur. Lawless and Morgenroth (2017) suggests 53 per cent of Irish 
trade volumes are transported to or through the UK. Thus any significant landbridge 
frictions pose the risk of significantly limiting Irish trade performance and international 
competitiveness.11 
In Table C, the impacts of the Brexit scenarios are examined in terms of the headline 
short-term GDP forecast for the Irish economy.  
TABLE C  THE IMPACTS OF BREXIT ON THE SHORTER-TERM COMMENTARY GDP FORECASTS 
Scenario Year % Growth Rate 2019/2018 
Baseline 2019 3.8 
Baseline 2020 3.2 
Disorderly No-Deal  2019 1.2 
Disorderly No-Deal 2020 2.4 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
11  Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth (2017). ‘Ireland’s international trade and transport connections’, Economic and Social 
Research Institute, Working Paper No. 573. 
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In all cases the Irish economy is expected to grow in the short to medium term; under the 
‘Disorderly No-Deal’, however, output is only expected to increase by 1.2 per cent in the 
present year and 2.4 per cent in 2020. This compares with a baseline, no-Brexit case, of 
output growth of 3.8 and 3.2 per cent respectively for both years. It must be noted that 
this methodology does not include any major disruptions to financial markets or 
transport links that may occur under a hard no-deal scenario. These factors, if they were 
to occur, would almost certainly worsen the impact on Ireland. 
References: 
Bergin, A., P. Economides, A. Garcia-Rodriguez and G. Murphy (2019). ‘Ireland and Brexit: 
modelling the impact of deal and no-deal scenarios’, Quarterly Economic Commentary 
Spring 2019, Special Article.  
Lawless, M., 2016a. Intermediate goods inputs and the UK content of Irish goods exports, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
Lawless, M., 2016b. ‘Irish-UK services trade and Brexit’, Working Paper No. WP595, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth, 2018. ‘Brexit and Irish consumers’, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary: Special Article, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
 
This Box was prepared by Philip Economides and Kieran McQuinn. 
 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
International monetary environment  
In its October assessment of the international financial environment, the IMF 
noted that financial conditions in advanced economies remained accommodative, 
with tightening conditions in emerging economies. However, they highlighted an 
increase in both immediate and medium-term risks arising from both monetary 
policy normalisation and trade tensions. They also noted that the degree to which 
policy rate increases and trade developments impact growth prospects critically 
depends on their impact on asset valuations and economic fundamentals. 
 
In recent months, global volatility has increased as documented by the CBOE VIX 
(Volatility Index)12 presented in Figure 12. This is likely driven by both Brexit 
concerns as well as global trade issues.  
 
 
                                                          
 
12  The VIX Index is a calculation designed to produce a measure of constant, 30-day expected volatility of the US stock 
market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices of S&P 500® Index (SPXSM) call and put options. On a global basis, 
it is one of the most recognised measures of volatility, widely reported by financial media and closely followed by a 
variety of market participants as a daily market indicator. 
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FIGURE 12 VIX VOLATILITY INDEX (%) 
 
 
Source:  St Louis Fed Database, from Chicago Board Options Exchange. 
 
In the Euro Area, the continued operation of accommodative monetary policy 
through record low policy rates provides a stabilising backstop for financial 
markets. The worsening outlook for the European economy, as well as reduced 
inflation rates, have lessened the likelihood of a policy rate hike by the ECB in 
2019. Extraordinary monetary policy measures, primarily in the form of 
quantitative easing, have been wound down but remain part of the toolkit if 
economic fundamentals deteriorate considerably. Figure 13 presents the EONIA 
rate, which continues to be negative in line with the policy rate stance. 
 
FIGURE 13 EURO OVERNIGHT INDEX AVERAGE, EONIA (%) 
 
Source:  European Central Bank, Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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Low policy rates in the Euro Area, as well as the sovereign asset purchase 
programme, have ensured that government bond yields have remained low for 
the past number of years. For Ireland, this has been particularly fortuitous given 
the highly indebted nature of the sovereign. Figure 14 presents the ten-year 
government bond yield for Ireland and selected other advanced economies. Irish 
bond yields have remained low throughout 2018 (sitting below UK and US levels). 
As rates will likely rise in the medium term, continued action to reduce the level 
of government indebtedness is critical in ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability. 
 
An open question under any monetary policy normalisation scenario is the level 
to which the policy rate may rise. Before the crisis, policy rates hovered at 
between 4 and 5 per cent. Recent research by Whelan (2018) notes that, for the 
Eurozone as a whole, demographic and productivity factors may lead to lower 
long-term growth rates in the coming years. This may lead to a reappraisal of 
what is the long-term ‘neutral’ real rate of interest for the European economy, 
the interest rate which allows the economy to grow at its potential level. If 
potential output growth is lower, this may lead to lower real interest rates in the 
medium term. For Ireland, this would be beneficial given the high debt levels. 
However, as Irish potential output growth is likely to be higher than the Eurozone 
average, it means that the real interest rate maybe be stimulatory and not 
‘neutral’ from an Irish economic perspective.  
 
FIGURE 14 TEN-YEAR GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD (%) 
 
Source:   St. Louis Fed. database. 
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Household Credit and Mortgage Market 
Credit flows to the household sector are important in terms of financing 
consumption and housing investment but they must be closely monitored for 
emerging financial stability risks. Figure 15 presents the growth rates of credit to 
households from Irish resident credit institutions.13 The data are split by loans for 
house purchase and other personal loans (auto finance, credit cards, student 
loans etc.). On an annualised basis, outstanding mortgage lending grew by 1 per 
cent to Q3 2018, a marginal increase on the previous quarter. Non-mortgage 
credit also continued to expand in Q3 2018 at an annualised rate of 0.2 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 15 GROWTH RATES OF CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Credit, Money and Banking Statistics.  
Notes:  Data are taken from Central Bank of Ireland data release A.18, Growth rates series codes 777 and 1,252.  
 
An important measure of the sustainability of activity in the mortgage market is 
the payment arrears rate. As of Q3 2018, the share of principal dwelling home 
(PDH) loans in arrears stood at 6.2 per cent, down marginally on the previous 
quarter and down from 7.0 per cent in Q3 2017. This constitutes a total of 9.4 per 
cent of the balance of outstanding PDH mortgages. The default rate on buy-to-let 
(BTL) loans has also reduced but remains at 14.7 per cent of accounts. For the 
most recent quarter, the rate of decline in arrears appears to have stalled, in 
particular for BTLs. Given the continued economic buoyancy over this period, it is 
likely the remaining stock of outstanding defaulted loans are long-term problem 
cases carried over from the boom. These cases will likely require financial 
restructuring or legal resolutions and are unlikely to be resolved by economic 
developments over time. For the Irish financial sector to fully recover from the 
 
                                                          
 
13  See CBI for details. 
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international financial crisis, the issue of non-performing loans must be fully dealt 
with.  
 
The risk to the mortgage market of heightened ECB policy rates is addressed in a 
Special Article accompanying this Commentary. Fahy et al. (2019) use household 
microdata to assess the ability of households to absorb the higher mortgage 
payments that would arise from increases in the policy rate.14 They find that a 
100 basis point increase in the policy rate would lead to a 50 basis point increase 
in new arrears flows, based on a measure of missed payments due to financial 
distress.15 The economy would appear to be in a better position now to absorb 
such a shock given the improvements in labour markets observed during the 
recovery while the mortgage market also appears to have become more resilient 
over time. 
 
FIGURE 16 IRISH HOUSEHOLD MORTGAGE ACCOUNTS IN ARREARS BY TYPE OF LOAN (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Mortgage Arrears Statistics. 
Notes:  PDH refers to principal dwelling houses loans while BTL are buy-to-let loans. Loans are defined in arrears if they are greater than 
90 days past due on their payments.  
 
Focusing on new mortgage lending, a total of €8.7 billion worth of new loans 
were drawn down in 2018. This represents a considerable increase on the 2017 
total of €7.25 billion and is the highest level of new lending since 2009. In terms 
of the number of loans, over 40,000 new loans were originated in 2018. This 
represents a sizeable increase from 32,000 in 2017.  
 
                                                          
 
14  M. Fahy, C. O’Toole and R. Slaymaker (2018). ‘The financial crisis and the changing profile of mortgage arrears in 
Ireland’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Winter 2018, Research Notes. 
15  The official definition of default as per the Basel criteria is 90 days past due. 
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FIGURE 17 TOTAL NEW MORTGAGE LENDING 2005-2018 (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Banking and Payments Federation Ireland.  
Note: Number of loans (LHS), Value of Lending € million (RHS). 
 
Given that credit availability tends to follow the economic cycle, it is critical to 
understand whether increases in lending are linked to economic fundamentals 
(such as income and population growth). In Figure 18, we present the growth in 
mortgage lending (value terms) and the growth rate in household income. It is 
clear that mortgage lending, at circa 20 per cent growth per annum, is fast 
outstripping income growth. However, the degree to which this indicates a 
financial stability risk depends on a) the credit conditions underlying the 
individual loans and b) the aggregate repayment capacity of the sector. In terms 
of the former factor, the macro-prudential framework deployed by the Central 
Bank in 2015 seeks to ensure that the credit conditions underlying the individual 
loans remain prudent. Recent research by McCann and Ryan (2016)16 indicates 
that this framework has improved the credit risk of new Irish loans.  
 
In terms of the repayment capacity, in a similar vein to Keenan and O’Brien 
(2018) we explore the trends in the ratio of new mortgage lending to net 
household disposable income on an aggregate basis (also in Figure 18 on the right 
hand axis).17 If mortgage lending increases relative to personal disposable 
income, this can indicate the sector is leveraging beyond a sustainable level. 
Indeed, in 2006, new mortgage lending accounted for nearly 50 per cent of total 
household personal net disposable income in Ireland. While there have been 
 
                                                          
 
16  McCann, F. and E. Ryan (2016). ‘Originating Loan to Value ratios and the resilience of mortgage portfolios’, Economic 
Letters, No 10/EL/16, Dublin: Central Bank of Ireland. 
17  Keenan, E., and M. O’Brien (2018). ‘New Mortgage Lending Activity in a Comparative Context’, Economic Letters, No 
8/EL/18, Dublin: Central Bank of Ireland.  
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increases more recently in this ratio for Ireland, it stands at just over 10 per cent 
as of 2018, which is well below the figures seen during the credit boom period. 
 
FIGURE 18 LENDING GROWTH, INCOME GROWTH (LHS) AND NEW LENDING TO NET DISPOSABLE 
INCOME (RHS) (%) 
 
 
Source:  New Lending Data from Banking and Payments Federation Ireland. Net disposable income of households – ESA code (B.6n_S1M) 
from CSO Annual National Accounts. 
Note: Net disposable income for 2018 has been grown forward from 2017 by 4.8 per cent in line with QEC forecasts for personal 
disposable income. 
 
Finally, to examine current household credit demand and supply conditions in 
Ireland in more detail, we outline recently collated survey data by the ESRI which 
capture information on applications and rejections for credit across a range of 
products. In Figure 19, we present the average application rate across mortgage 
loans, car loans, personal loans and credit cards for 2018 as well as the average 
rejection rate for those households who applied. The figures indicate that 
approximately 4 per cent of Irish households applied for a mortgage in 2018, 
8 per cent applied for a car loan, 7 per cent for a personal loan and less than 2 per 
cent for a credit card. In terms of loan success, nearly 30 per cent of mortgage 
applications were rejected. This is higher than the other loan types and indicates 
the more intrusive screening that takes place for long-term home purchase 
finance relative to other credit transactions. The rejection rate was just over 6 per 
cent for car finance, over 11 per cent for personal loans and nearly 15 per cent 
for credit cards.  
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FIGURE 19 HOUSEHOLD CREDIT DEMAND AND SUPPLY – ESRI SURVEY EVIDENCE – 2018 (%) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI Economic Sentiment Monitor. 
 
Trends in SME and corporate credit market 
A sufficient supply of credit to SMEs is critical in ensuring enterprises can manage 
day-to-day operations such as supply chain and inventory organisation. It also 
helps firms deploy capital for long-term productivity enhancing investments.  
 
Figure 20 presents new lending to SMEs for the first three quarters of the year 
over the period 2011 to 2018. New lending has been increasing steadily in each 
year from 2015 onwards. The annualised growth rate for 2018 was 8 per cent. 
Considering the sectoral composition of lending, particularly large accelerations 
can be observed in construction, hotels and restaurants. It is noteworthy that 
there has been a decline in new lending to the wholesale and retail sector.  
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FIGURE 20 NEW LENDING TO SMES (LEVEL, € MILLION) – TOTAL Q1-Q3 PER ANNUM 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
 
While monitoring overall lending trends can be informative, it does not allow a 
disentangling of credit demand from credit supply factors. To get more insight 
into each of these dynamics separately, we present loan application and 
rejections data from the ECB survey of SMEs (Figure 21). We present the data for 
Ireland as well as the median value for other European countries for which data 
were available. Figures 21 A.1 and A.2 present the application and rejection rate 
for term loans. In the most recent data (April to September 2018) Irish SMEs had 
a similar application rate to their European peers of approximately 24 per cent. 
However, credit supply conditions appear tighter in Ireland with rejection rates 
over 7 per cent, which is nearly double the median level in the other EU 
countries. It is noteworthy that the rejection rate for Irish loans appears to have 
increased after Brexit which may reflect banks reappraising the credit risk of Irish 
companies exposed to UK trade. In terms of short-term credit demand, 
application rates are much lower in Ireland than in other European countries 
which may be suggestive of lower credit requirements.18 It is also noteworthy 
that the application for short-term loans by Irish companies was comparable to 
other European countries until the Brexit referendum. Thereafter, it has trended 
downward in a marked fashion. Credit rejections for short-term facilities also rose 
after the UK European Union membership referendum but are now in line with 
other European countries.  
 
 
                                                          
 
18  ECB SAFE data also indicate that discouraged borrowers (those that did not apply due to possible rejection) has been 
falling in line with other European countries. Gargan et al. (2018) also show that Irish firms have considerable own 
funds which may be reducing the requirement to obtain external financing and muting the level of loan demand.    
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FIGURE 21 SME CREDIT APPLICATIONS AND REJECTIONS (%) 
A.1 Credit Applications for Bank Term Loans B.1 Credit Applications for Short-Term Facilities 
  
 
A.2 Credit Rejections for Bank Term Loans B.2 Credit Rejections for Short-Term Facilities 
  
 
Sources:  ECB SAFE Survey. 
Notes:  Other countries include: AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT. Application rate indicates the percentage of firms that applied 
for credit.  
 
Looking forward, enterprises are likely to face a shock to cash flows and working 
capital if a hard-Brexit scenario occurs. Having sufficient credit lines and funding 
in place to manage any immediate disruptions to business operations or supply 
chains is important. To this end, the Government has introduced a Brexit loan 
scheme through the Strategic Banking Corporation of Ireland, which provides low 
cost funding to cover Brexit related working capital and investment needs. 
Measures such as this can be vital in ensuring firms do not face a credit crunch at 
a time when they are trying to deal with significant changes in trading 
relationships.  
 
Interest rates and the cost of finance 
The standard variable rate on new mortgage loans in Ireland stood at 3.12 per 
cent as of Q4 2018; this is down slightly year-on-year from 3.32 in Q4 2017. The 
market for fixed rates has become more competitive and the average rate on 
one- to three-year fixed rate products stood at 2.74 per cent in Q4 2018 which is 
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down 30 basis points in 12 months. However, when comparing Irish new house 
purchase loans relative to other Eurozone economies, it is clear interest rates on 
mortgages in the domestic market remain the highest of comparator countries 
(Figure 22).  
  
FIGURE 22 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS (%) 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data 
differ between this chart presented and the text, as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the 
new business standard variable rate (SVR) is only for new drawdowns. 
 
A similar picture emerges in relation to corporate interest rates. Figure 23 
presents the interest rates on new business loans for non-financial corporates in 
Ireland relative to the average for the Eurozone. Two series are presented: 
1) loans greater than €1 million which is a proxy for large companies and 
2) capturing loans of less than €250,000 which is used as a proxy for loans for 
SMEs. In December 2018, the average rate on new loans for large Irish corporates 
was 1.92 per cent. The Eurozone average was 1.3 per cent, approximately 60 
basis points lower than the Irish rate. For small Irish corporate loans, the interest 
rate in December 2018 was 4.29 per cent compared to the Eurozone average of 
2.24 per cent, a full 200 basis points lower than the Irish figure.  
 
Given the common monetary policy rate, the ongoing existence of a wedge 
between the Irish and European markets can be explained by a range of 
structural factors of the banking system such as risk appetite, competition, 
regulations and the cost of funds for Irish banks. Policies to enhance the 
competitiveness of the banking sector and its efficiency are required.  
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The wedge may also reflect a greater risk profile amongst Irish SMEs or whether 
they have collateral available.  
 
FIGURE 23 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS – EUROPEAN COMPARISON (%)  
 
Source:  ECB MFI data. Small loans refer to loans less than €250,000. 
 
To provide more insight into the variation of SME interest rates within Ireland, 
Figure 24 presents the average new lending interest rates by sector for the first 
three quarters of 2018. The lowest rates are in the hotels, real estate and 
manufacturing sectors. Often these sectors would have access to physical 
collateral in the form of buildings or machinery that could be used to lower the 
cost of finance. Sectors such as business services, education and transport face 
the highest rates. 
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FIGURE 24 INTEREST RATES ON NEW CORPORATE LOANS – SECTOR COMPARISON (BAR IS 
MARKET AVERAGE)  
 
Source:  CBI SME Credit Data. 
 
Inflation Outlook 
While the early months of 2018 had seen a moderation in inflation, both the 
overall Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) have started to rise in the final three quarters of 2018. Figure 25 presents 
the inflation rate for these series and the CPI excluding energy and unprocessed 
foods. While increasing inflationary pressures are evident from the CPI and HICP, 
core inflation which excludes energy and unprocessed foods is much weaker and 
suggests a more muted inflation outlook for the domestic economy. In the most 
recent data point there has been some convergence between the core and 
headline CPI.  
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FIGURE 25 ANNUAL INFLATION RATE (%)  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The difference in price trends between the goods and services sectors is quite 
apparent. The underlying trends in the CPI (Figure 26) up to January 2019 
indicates service prices have been accelerating. Goods prices on the other hand 
have been declining and, while it appeared some of the declines in goods prices 
were abating, the final months of 2018 and into 2019 show an accelerated rate of 
decline in goods prices.  
 
In terms of the product-specific contributions to inflation, the product groupings 
which are lowering the inflation rate are miscellaneous goods and services, 
household furnishings, equipment and household maintenance and food and 
non-alcoholic beverages. Housing and utilities, hotels and restaurants and energy 
products are providing the greatest stimulus to inflation. 
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FIGURE 26 DECOMPOSITION OF ANNUAL (%) CPI GROWTH INTO GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
In light of the Commentary’s forecast of strong domestic demand and the 
continued positive developments in the labour market performance, prices are 
expected to increase over the next two years. Consumer prices are expected to 
increase moderately by 1 per cent in 2019, followed by 1.4 per cent in 2020. 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2018) address the possibility of greater trade frictions 
in the short term, estimating that rising costs of UK imports, in the case of a ‘no-
deal’ outcome, would result in the Irish CPI increasing by between 2 and 3.1 per 
cent.19  
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
Due to the well-documented issues associated with measuring output in Ireland, 
consumption expenditure is a more robust indicator of underlying domestic 
economic activity (FitzGerald, 2015; 2018).20 The latest quarterly National 
Accounts show that, on an annualised basis, personal consumption expenditure 
increased by 2.6 per cent in Q4 2018. The continued strong growth in household 
spending is being driven by the increase in employment, increasing disposable 
incomes and improvement in household balance sheets.  
 
 
                                                          
 
19  Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth (2018). ‘Brexit and Irish Consumers’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2018, 
Special Articles. 
20  FitzGerald, John, (2015). ‘Problems Interpreting the National Accounts in a Globalised Economy — Ireland,’ Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, Summer 2015: Special Articles.  
FitzGerald, John, (2018). ‘National Accounts for a global economy: the case of Ireland’, Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Summer 2018: Special Articles. 
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FIGURE 27  QUARTERLY PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ON GOODS AND SERVICES – CONSTANT 
MARKET PRICES AND SEASONALLY ADJUSTED 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Retail sales are a well-known leading indicator for consumption. By examining 
what type of goods and services households are purchasing, sources of growth in 
consumption can be more clearly established. Table 4 presents the annual growth 
in retail sales volume for select items in Q4 2018. Across all sectors, retail sales 
have risen relative to the same quarter the previous year. Overall retail business 
increased by 4.4 per cent, or 3.7 per cent when sales of motor vehicles were 
excluded. Sales in furniture and lighting were particularly impressive, up 12.4 per 
cent, which is likely due to strong growth in the housing market.  
 
TABLE 4 GROWTH IN SELECT RETAIL SALES (VOLUME) ITEMS (Q4 2018) 
Retail Business – NACE Rev. 2  
Volume of Sales 
Annual % change 
Motor Trades 5.1 
Non-specialised stores (excluding department stores) 5.3 
Department stores 2.0 
Clothing, Footwear and Textiles 1.3 
Furniture and lighting 12.4 
All retail businesses 4.4 
All retail businesses, excluding motor trades 3.7 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
The overall trends in retail sales are displayed in Figure 28. This chart presents a 
three-month rolling average of annual growth of total retail sales, sales excluding 
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the motor trade, and sales of household equipment. Overall retail sales (both 
including and excluding motor sales) continue to perform strongly. The growth in 
household equipment sales remains well above the average of all retail sales, 
with the three-month rolling rate up 16.6 per cent in December 2018. The 
increase in activity in the housing market with more new builds and renovations 
is likely a driving factor in the accelerating sales of household equipment. Despite 
remaining positive throughout 2018, there was a slight dip in retail growth 
towards the end of the year. With the Brexit issue still unresolved, this fall in 
growth may continue into 2019 and could cause difficulties for Irish retailers. 
 
FIGURE 28 AVERAGE GROWTH (%) IN RETAIL SALES INDEX VOLUME ADJUSTED (BASE 2005=100), 
THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Figure 29 presents the ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index which tracks the 
monthly views of households towards their current and future economic 
perspectives. The index declined significantly during Q4 2018 and as of November 
was at its lowest point since Q1 2015. The primary reason for the fall in the index 
has been a deterioration in consumer confidence with regards to future 
expectations. It is likely that consumer uncertainty around the outcome of Brexit 
and the increased possibility of a ‘no-deal’ scenario is contributing towards a 
negative outlook for the Irish economy. While there was an uptick in consumer 
confidence in January 2019, this came as a result of a greater appetite for major 
household purchases and improved perceptions amongst households as to their 
own financial situation. The general economic outlook on the other hand 
continued to deteriorate.  
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FIGURE 29 ESRI/KBC CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDICATORS 
 
Source:  ESRI/KBC Consumer Sentiment Index. 
 
In addition to understanding trends in consumer sentiment, further insight into 
Irish households’ appetite for spending and views on economic activity can be 
drawn from their savings behaviour. Figure 30 displays the three-month rolling 
average of the ESRI/Bank of Ireland Savings Index, which measures Irish people’s 
sentiment towards savings. Overall, the index remained relatively stable in Q4 
2018 as it has been for much of the year. From January 2018 to December 2018 
the three-month average index has fallen by 2.8 per cent down to 101 index 
points. As of January 2019, the index is currently at 101.5 index points.  
 
To get a better idea of what drives changes in the index the graph also includes 
the two sub-indices which compose the main savings index, the Savings Attitudes 
and the Savings Environment. For much of 2018 these sub-indices moved in 
opposite directions, with attitudes towards savings improving and views on the 
savings environment deteriorating. However, towards the end of the year both 
these sub-indices started converging. On the attitude side there was a decline, 
both in the amount of people saving and satisfaction with the level of savings, 
while on the environment side there was some improvement in individuals’ views 
towards the savings environment today and in six months’ time.  
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FIGURE 30  SAVINGS INDEX AND SUB-INDICES, THREE-MONTH ROLLING AVERAGE 
 
Source:  ESRI/Bank of Ireland Savings Index. 
 
The overall position of Irish households’ net worth, which is the stock of financial 
and housing assets minus the stock of liabilities, is presented in Figure 31. Irish 
household net worth grew by 8 per cent year-on-year in Q3 2018. Contributing to 
the rise in net worth over this period was the increase in the value of financial 
assets which rose by €8 billion (2.1 per cent) and a decline in the value of 
liabilities which reduced by €4 billion (2.6 per cent). However, the main 
contributor to the improvement in household balance sheets has been the rise in 
the value of housing assets, which increased by €45 billion (9.2 per cent) over the 
same period. Household net worth was severely diminished in the years after the 
financial crisis as housing assets fell sharply in value. In Q1 2013 household net 
worth was €430 billion, down from €719 billion in Q2 2007 and housing assets 
were worth €289 billion, well below the previous high of €607 billion. While still 
remaining 12 per cent below their peak level, housing assets have recovered by 
85 per cent since the low point in Q1 2013. The recovery in the value of housing 
assets is the main reason for the increase in household net worth to €769 billion.  
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FIGURE 31  IRISH HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH (€ BILLION) 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Quarterly Financial Accounts. 
 
While household consumption is expected to continue growing over the next two 
years, a slowdown in the fall in unemployment and associated further decreases 
in consumer sentiment will likely moderate the increase. In 2019 we expect 
consumption expenditure to grow by 2.3 per cent and at a slightly slower pace of 
2.2 per cent in 2020.  
 
Property market developments 
Property price growth continued to decelerate in Q4 2018 and is currently at its 
lowest rate since mid-2016. Figure 32 plots the year-on-year changes in 
residential property prices by property type.  
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FIGURE 32 ANNUAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH (%) BY DWELLING 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Since April 2018, annual property price growth has fallen month-on-month and as 
of December the growth rate was 6.5 per cent. This is a considerable decline from 
the growth rate of 13.3 per cent seen earlier in the year. One explanation for this 
drop in price growth could be the increased number of new residential properties 
completed in 2018. Figures released by the CSO21 show there were 25.4 per cent 
more dwelling completions in 2018 in comparison to 2017.  
 
Another likely reason for the decelerating growth rate comes from reduced 
demand as a consequence of the Central Bank’s macro-prudential regulations. 
Due to the restrictions posed by the regulations (in the form of loan-to-value and 
loan-to-income limits), potential buyers are unable to borrow in excess of the 
regulatory parameters. As house prices continue to rise, an increasing number of 
buyers will likely become restricted by the regulations and demand for residential 
property will continue to fall. Some seasonality in terms of credit access may be 
evident given the system of allowances to the macro-prudential limits (whereby 
banks are enabled to lend a specific portion of total new lending in excess of the 
rules).  
 
Across different types of dwelling, the divergence in growth rates between house 
prices and apartments has somewhat narrowed over the final quarter of 2018.  
 
                                                          
 
21  CSO: New Dwelling Completions – Quarter 4, 2018.  
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In August 2018 there was a 4.2 percentage point difference in the rate of 
property price growth between houses and apartments. This difference has fallen 
to 1.2 percentage points in December 2018 with house prices growing at 6.6 per 
cent and apartment prices growing at 7.8 per cent. In Dublin in particular, there 
has been a significant drop in the growth rate of apartment prices, down to 2.9 
per cent in December. 
 
Property price developments for Dublin and the rest of Ireland are presented in 
Figure 33. The deceleration of property price growth is most prevalent in Dublin 
where year-on-year property price growth fell to 3.8 per cent in December, the 
lowest growth rate in the capital since June 2016. Property price growth in the 
rest of the country fell at a slower pace over the second half of the year and as of 
December was at 9.6 per cent. Due to the relatively high house prices in Dublin, 
the Central Bank’s macro-prudential regulations are likely to be more binding in 
Dublin than the rest of the country. This is likely stifling demand in the capital 
which is one of the reasons why price growth has been falling more in Dublin 
than elsewhere. 
 
FIGURE 33 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY PRICE GROWTH (%) BY REGION 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
 
Across the country rent levels continue to rise. In Q3 2018, the National Rent 
Index grew by 7.5 per cent compared to Q3 2017. As well as the national index, 
the ESRI/RTB Rental Index also produces indicators at a regional level, namely for 
Dublin, the Greater Dublin Area excluding Dublin (GDA) and outside of the GDA. 
These indices are presented in Figure 34. Annual rent rates in Dublin grew by 9.5 
per cent in Q3 2018, a higher rate than the other regional areas. Rents in the GDA 
and outside the GDA both grew at around 6.5 per cent. Increases in the rent level 
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across the country are expected to continue as the level of housing supply fails to 
meet the country’s structural demand.  
 
FIGURE 34 RTB RENT GROWTH – NATIONAL, DUBLIN, GDA (EXCL. DUBLIN) AND OUTSIDE GDA  
 
Source:  Residential Tenancies Board (RTB). 
 
Figure 35 shows how public sentiment towards the property market has changed 
over time. Data are taken from the ESRI Economic Survey Monitor which captures 
individual perception of the housing market and expectations regarding the 
future dynamic of the market. Respondents were asked whether they thought it 
was currently a good time to buy a house and in a separate question whether it 
was currently a good time to sell a house. Since early 2017 there has been a 
crossover in sentiment, with more respondents believing that it is a good time to 
sell rather than buy a house. The trend in the gap has been getting larger since 
then and as of January 2019, 68 per cent of respondents thought it was currently 
a good time to sell in comparison to 28 per cent who thought it was currently a 
good time to buy. This shift in sentiment may be indicative of a belief amongst 
the general public that further rapid increases in house prices are unlikely or that 
house prices may start falling in the not so distant future. Such sentiment may in 
turn be contributing to the slowdown in property price growth, given that price 
expectations often act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 
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FIGURE 35 DO YOU THINK IT IS CURRENTLY A GOOD TIME TO BUY/SELL A HOUSE 
 
Source:  ESRI Survey, Economic Sentiment Monitor Data. 
 
Figure 36 highlights how property price growth in Ireland compares to other 
OECD countries. Ireland had the second highest rate of house price growth in the 
OECD, trailing only Iceland over the three-year period from Q3 2015 to Q3 2018. 
The 26.6 per cent rate of real house price growth over this period was 16.6 
percentage points greater than the OECD average and 18.2 percentage points 
greater than the Euro Area average. 
 
FIGURE 36 REAL HOUSE PRICE GROWTH FOR OECD MEMBERS  
 
Source:  OECD. 
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SUPPLY 
Investment 
Investment in long-term capital is a critical component in determining the 
productivity of the Irish economy. Capital investment is often highly volatile and 
can be very sensitive to changes in economic conditions and, in particular, 
uncertainty. Given the irreversible nature of fixed capital investment, research 
has shown that firms are always wary about investing in periods of heightened 
uncertainty (Awano et al., 2018).22  
 
From an Irish perspective, at present the two main sources of uncertainty for 
firms are: a) Brexit, which is likely to most affect domestic SMEs and  
b) international trade uncertainties, which are more likely to affect the 
multinational sector. Given the importance of the multinational sector for 
Ireland, any contraction in global demand or increase in global uncertainty will 
have a knock-on impact on their investments in Ireland. For domestic companies 
the ongoing uncertainty due to Brexit is likely to be deterring companies from 
committing to new large investments.  
  
Despite the uncertainty, investment in Ireland has remained strong through 2017 
into 2018. This is mainly driven by strong growth in construction activity.  
Figure 37 presents the trends in modified Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Ireland 
to Q4 2018. Overall investment decreased by 4 per cent year-on-year, largely due 
to a decline in intangible assets. Focusing on the subcomponents, year-on-year 
growth in construction investment rose by 7 per cent, machinery and equipment 
investment declined by 15 per cent and investment in intangibles fell by 26 per 
cent.  
 
 
                                                          
 
22  Awano, G., N. Bloom, T. Dolby, P. Mizen, R. Riley, T. Senga, J. van Reenen, J. Vyas and P. Wales (2018). ‘A firm-level 
perspective on micro- and macro-level uncertainty; An analysis of business expectations and uncertainty’, from the 
UK Management and Expectations Survey, No ESCoE DP-2018-10, Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE) 
Discussion Papers, Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE). 
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FIGURE 37  COMPONENTS OF MODIFIED INVESTMENT (€ MILLION) 
 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Accounts Data.  
 
The tail-off in investment in machinery and equipment is particularly noteworthy. 
These assets represent the day-to-day capital that enterprises in the real 
economy use to produce output. Indeed, Gargan et al. (2018)23 find these to be 
the most popular investment type amongst SMEs. The fact that the trend growth 
rate in machinery and equipment has dropped in the latest quarter likely reflects 
the increase in uncertainty around the Brexit issue. 
 
 
                                                          
 
23   Gargan, E., M. Lawless, M. Martinez-Cillero and C. O’Toole (2018). ‘Exploring Investment Patterns for the Irish SMEs: 
New Survey Evidence’, Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Article, Economic and Social Research Institute. 
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FIGURE 38  FOUR-QUARTER ROLLING AVERAGE GROWTH RATE IN INVESTMENT (%) 
 
 
Source:  ESRI analysis of CSO data. 
 
Investment sentiment 
To better understand the role of Brexit in driving current Irish investment 
sentiment, we draw on data from the Bank of Ireland/ESRI Savings and 
Investment Index which tracks Irish households’ views on the investment 
environment. We first identify households who indicate that it is currently a bad 
time to invest in each month since the index began in October 2017. We then run 
a simple model which compares how more likely households were to indicate 
now is a bad time to invest as compared to January 2018. We also control for the 
age, education and employment status of the household. Figure 39 indicates the 
difference in the likelihood of indicating it is a bad time to invest in each month 
relative to January 2018. The results indicate that in December 2018 and January 
2019, households have become increasingly likely to indicate it is currently a bad 
time to invest (in the other periods the results are not statistically different from 
January 2018); in January, there was a 13 percentage point increase in the 
number indicating it is a bad time to invest compared to January 2018. The rapid 
increase in this likelihood is correlated with the rejection of the Withdrawal 
Agreement in the UK Parliament and the ongoing uncertainty about the Brexit 
issue.  
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FIGURE 39 ‘BAD TIME TO INVEST NOW’ – CURRENT INVESTMENT SENTIMENT OCTOBER 2017- 
FEBRUARY 2019 
 
Source:  ESRI/Bank of Ireland Investment Sentiment Index.  
 
We also look at whether or not households are also pessimistic about the 
investment climate in six months’ time. This is presented in Figure 40 which runs 
a similar model but includes the forward-looking investment sentiment indicator 
as the dependent variable. This also indicates that since December, sentiment has 
worsened and households increasingly think it will be a bad time to invest in six 
months.  
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FIGURE 40 ‘BAD TIME TO INVEST IN SIX MONTHS’ – CURRENT INVESTMENT SENTIMENT 
OCTOBER 2017- FEBRUARY 2019 
 
 
Source:  ESRI/Bank of Ireland Investment Sentiment Index.  
 
While these indicators capture household investment sentiment and are not 
direct measures of corporate investment appetite, they do provide some timely 
information as to the deterioration in views around investment. This is likely to 
lead to the postponement or cancellation of capital projects which has adverse 
implications for the development of the country’s capital stock across different 
asset classes. 
 
Construction outlook 
In terms of our outlook for construction investment, we expect that building 
investment will continue to increase particularly as the rate of housing 
construction expands. Given the strong increase of output from 14,400 units in 
2017 to 18,000 units in 2018, we expect continued growth in 2019 and 2020. 
Both the increased private sector output and the expanded commitment by 
Government to increase capital spend in housing (particularly related to the 
delivery of social and affordable units) in Budget 2019 are likely to be key factors 
supporting output increases in the sector. Consequently, we forecast 25,000 units 
in 2019 increasing to 30,000 units in 2020 (Figure 41). However, as noted in 
McQuinn and O’Toole (2018),24 a hard Brexit may have a negative impact on the 
supply side of the residential market as a number of basic materials for the 
market are sourced through the UK. 
 
                                                          
 
24  McQuinn K. and C. O’Toole (2018). ‘Presentation on impacts of Brexit on the housing market’ to the Oireachtas 
Committee on Housing, Leinster House, Dublin, November 13. 
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FIGURE 41 ANNUAL HOUSING COMPLETIONS (2019-2020 FORECASTS) – TO 2018 ACTUAL 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
A notable feature of the recovery in construction has been a strong increase in 
construction activity for commercial property activity. This is depicted in  
Figure 42 as an increasing share of other building and construction in total 
construction investment from the CSO quarterly National Accounts. Given the 
expected increase in residential dwelling construction, this does increase the 
likelihood that capacity constraints could limit general construction activities 
going forward.  
 
FIGURE 42 INVESTMENT IN CONSTRUCTION BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY (% OF TOTAL) 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office.  
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Forecasts 
Therefore, despite the international uncertainties, we maintain an optimistic 
position for overall investment in 2019 and 2020, driven, in the main, by the 
construction sector. In particular, we expect annual average growth in investment 
of 9.5 per cent in 2019 and 7.5 per cent in 2020. Further moderation in 2020 is 
likely if global conditions continue to deteriorate and if a hard Brexit materialises.  
 
LABOUR MARKET 
Conditions in the Irish labour market continued to improve in Q4 2018, with 
continued increases in the level of employment and reductions in both the 
amount of people on the Live Register and the amount of people in long-term 
unemployment. Earnings also improved over this period as wage rates across the 
majority of sectors increased. However, there has been some evidence of a 
moderation of activity in the labour market with unemployment rates levelling 
off at 5.7 per cent over the second half of 2018.  
 
Unemployment 
While the Live Register is not a precise measure of unemployment,25 as it includes 
part-time and some seasonal and casual workers, it is one of the most up-to-date 
and detailed labour market measures. On a seasonally adjusted basis, the number 
of people on the Live Register decreased by 37,800 between January 2018 and 
January 2019, a fall of 15.9 per cent. Currently there are 200,300 people on the 
Live Register, a figure which has been in decline since August 2016. However this 
remains some way off the lowest figures of under 160,000 seen before 2007. 
  
The total number of people under the age of 25 on the Live Register as of January 
2019 was 21,400, which is a fall of 18.6 per cent from the same period in 2018. 
Among those aged 25 or older there were 178,800 people on the Live Register in 
January 2019, a fall of 15.5 per cent from the same period the previous year.  
 
 
                                                          
 
25  The Live Register provides a monthly series of the numbers of people registered for Jobseekers Benefit, Jobseekers 
Allowance or other statutory entitlements at the Irish Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection. 
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FIGURE 43 NUMBERS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY AGE: OCTOBER 2006 TO OCTOBER 2018 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Long-term unemployment is defined as being out of work for a period greater 
than 12 months and its negative consequences for individuals and society have 
been well documented.26 The longer a person is unemployed, the more difficulty 
they are likely to find returning to the workforce as a result of deskilling, reduced 
motivation and apprehension from employers about hiring someone who has 
been out of work for a sustained period of time. 
 
Table 5 shows the number and proportion of people on the Live Register by 
duration. As of January 2019 the number of people who can be classified as long-
term unemployed was 79,000 which is 39.6 per cent of the total number on the 
Live Register. Viewed against comparable figures for 2014, there has been a 
substantial fall in terms of both the number and proportion of people in long-
term unemployment. Over the five years the amount of people on the Live 
Register for more than a year has fallen by nearly 100,000, and the amount of 
people that have been on the Live Register for more than three years has fallen 
by 55,000.  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
26  Abraham, Catharine G., Kristin Sandusky, John Haltiwanger and James R. Spletzer (2016). ‘The Consequences of Long 
Term Unemployment: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data,’ Working Papers 16-40, Center for 
Economic Studies, US Census Bureau.  
J. O’Connell, P., S. McGuinness and E. Kelly (2010). ‘A Statistical Profiling Model of Long-Term Unemployment Risk in 
Ireland’. Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Papers. 
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TABLE 5  NUMBERS AND PROPORTIONS ON THE LIVE REGISTER (‘000) BY DURATION 
  2014M01 2018M01 2019M01 
  (‘000) % (‘000) % (‘000) % 
All durations 399.2   237.4   199.6   
Under 1 year 218.0 54.6 139.4 58.7 120.6 60.4 
1 year and over 181.2 45.4 98.0 41.3 79.0 39.6 
1 year – less than 2 years 47.3 11.8 25.6 10.8 21.4 10.7 
2 years – less than 3 years 33.1 8.3 15.1 6.4 12.6 6.3 
3 years and over 100.9 25.3 57.3 24.1 45.0 22.5 
 
Sources:  Live Register, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Following CSO revisions in January, provisional unemployment rates for the latter 
months of 2018 have been adjusted upward. These new figures reveal that from 
August 2018 to January 2019 the unemployment rate has remained fixed at  
5.7 per cent. This may be symptomatic of the fact that the Irish economy is 
reaching full employment and so there is likely to be a slowdown in the rate at 
which unemployment is falling.  
 
FIGURE 44 SEASONALLY ADJUSTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY MONTH (%) 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Employment  
Seasonally adjusted figures for employment reveal continued strong growth in 
the number of people working in the Irish economy. An additional 50,000 jobs 
were added in Q4 2018 in comparison to the same period the previous year. 
bringing the total number of people in employment up to 2,272,200. The labour 
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force participation rate remained at 62.2 per cent in Q4 2018, the same rate as it 
had been in Q4 2017. 
 
On a seasonally adjusted basis, the number of people in full-time employment 
increased by 2.8 per cent from Q4 2017 up to 1,815,000 in Q4 2018. Over the 
same period the number of people in part-time employment has increased by 0.5 
per cent up to 461,400.27 The number of people who are part-time 
underemployed, which is a measure of the number of people who are currently 
working part time but would like more hours, fell by 6 per cent over this period. 
The fall in this measure suggests there has been an increase in the number of 
people who moved from part-time to full-time work in the Irish labour force. As 
of Q4 2018, 80 per cent of the Irish workforce are working full time.  
 
FIGURE 45 SEASONALLY ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT, FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME (‘000) 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office 
 
Figure 46 shows the year-on-year change in the rate of employment for a select 
group of NACE sectors.28 The annual rate of employment fell across all sectors in 
the years after the financial crisis, with consistent positive rates of growth only 
reoccurring from 2013 onwards. Construction was by far the most negatively 
impacted sector with the annual rate of growth falling as low as -38 per cent in 
2009. Since 2013, employment growth has generally been positive across all 
 
                                                          
 
27  Seasonally adjusted full-time and part-time series do not equal seasonally adjusted employment due to the method 
of seasonal adjustment used. Seasonal adjustment is conducted using the direct method meaning the sum of 
components of a series may not be equal to the overall series. 
28  NACE (Nomenclature of Economic Activities) is the European statistical classification of economic activities. 
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sectors with especially strong rates of growth in the Construction and 
Accommodation and food service sectors. 
 
In Q4 2018, employment increased by 7.9 per cent in the Construction sector,  
3.7 per cent in the Accommodation and food service sector, 1 per cent in the 
Wholesale and retail trade sector and 0.3 per cent in the Financial, insurance and 
real estate sector. 
 
FIGURE 46  ANNUAL SEASONALLY ADJUSTED EMPLOYMENT GROWTH BY SECTOR 
 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office 
 
The overall employment rate in Ireland remains similar to the EU at around  
69 per cent as of Q3 2018. However, when comparing employment rates by age 
and education status clear differences emerge. Employment rates among the 
younger (15-24 years) and older generations (55-64 years) are higher in Ireland 
than in the EU, whereas prime age workers (25-54 years) face lower employment 
rates. The difference is particularly stark for those between the ages of 15-24 
where the employment rate in Ireland is 6.7 percentage points higher than in the 
EU. Examining employment rates by level of education reveals an even greater 
difference among the younger cohort. For those with a tertiary level of education 
the employment rate is 18.7 percentage points higher in Ireland relative to the 
EU, while for those with an education level of lower secondary or below, the 
employment rate was 6.3 percentage points below the EU average. Previous 
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
2
0
0
0
Q
1
2
0
0
0
Q
4
2
0
0
1
Q
3
2
0
0
2
Q
2
2
0
0
3
Q
1
2
0
0
3
Q
4
2
0
0
4
Q
3
2
0
0
5
Q
2
2
0
0
6
Q
1
2
0
0
6
Q
4
2
0
0
7
Q
3
2
0
0
8
Q
2
2
0
0
9
Q
1
2
0
0
9
Q
4
2
0
1
0
Q
3
2
0
1
1
Q
2
2
0
1
2
Q
1
2
0
1
2
Q
4
2
0
1
3
Q
3
2
0
1
4
Q
2
2
0
1
5
Q
1
2
0
1
5
Q
4
2
0
1
6
Q
3
2
0
1
7
Q
2
2
0
1
8
Q
1
2
0
1
8
Q
4
Construction Wholesale and retail trade
Accommodation and food service Financial, insurance and real estate
54 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Sp r i ng  20 19   
work by McGuinness et al. (2018)29 found Ireland to have a relatively high rate of 
overskilling in comparison to other EU countries. The employment rate 
differentials for young people may be a reflection of this overskilling as those 
with higher levels of education may be taking on lower skilled jobs.30 However, as 
noted in the same paper, caution must be exercised in interpreting the 
differences in employment rates as evidence of overskilling. Differences in 
employment rates can be explained by a wide range of factors including variance 
in the quality of jobs between regions. If there is a higher proportion of jobs in 
Ireland which require tertiary education in comparison to the EU average, then 
the relatively high rate of employment for college graduates and relatively low 
rate of employment for those with lower levels of education may not be 
indicative of overskilling. 
 
TABLE 6  Q3 2018 EMPLOYMENT RATES BY AGE GROUP AND EDUCATION (%) 
Education Level Age Group Ireland EU 
All Education levels 
Total (15-64 years) 69.1 69.0  
From 15 to 24 years 43.1 36.4 
From 25 to 54 years 79 80.8  
From 55 to 64 years 60.4 59.2 
Lower secondary or below 
Total (15-64 years) 37.8 47.3 
From 15 to 24 years 13.9 20.2 
From 25 to 54 years 54.5 63.8  
From 55 to 64 years 48.3 44.6 
Upper secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 70.2 72 
From 15 to 24 years 58.0 47.5 
From 25 to 54 years 76.8 82.3  
From 55 to 64 years 62.4 60.8  
Tertiary 
Total (15-64 years) 83.9 84.2  
From 15 to 24 years 79 60.3  
From 25 to 54 years 86.6 88.2  
From 55 to 64 years 70 74 
 
Sources:  Labour Force Survey, Central Statistics Office, Eurostat. 
 
Earnings 
In Q4 2018, seasonally adjusted Average Hourly Earnings increased by 3.5 per 
cent, to €23.40 per hour relative to the same period in 2018. The largest increase 
 
                                                          
 
29  McGuinness, S., K. Pouliakas and P. Redmond (2018). ‘Skills mismatch: concepts, measurement and policy 
approaches’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 32: 985-1015. 
30  See European Commission (2015). ‘Measuring skills mismatch’, European Commission Analytical Web Note 7/2015, 
European Commission, Luxembourg. 
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for the quarter was observed in the Mining and quarrying sector, rising annually 
by 11.8 per cent (an additional €2.88 per hour). This was followed closely by the 
Transportation and storage sector which rose by 10.3 per cent (€2.17 per hour). 
Other notably high increases occurred in Other service activities (+7.8 per cent), 
Administrative and support services (+7.5 per cent), Construction (+6.2 per cent), 
and Financial, insurance and real estate activities (+6 per cent). The only sector in 
which there was a fall in the seasonally adjusted Average Hourly Earnings over 
this period was in Professional, scientific and technical activities (-1.6 per cent). 
Figure 47 highlights wages persistently trending upwards since the end of 2015. 
As of Q4 2018, average weekly earnings across all sectors reached €762.22, a 4.6 
per cent increase from Q4 2017.  
 
FIGURE 47  TRENDS IN AVERAGE EARNINGS PER WEEK AND PER HOUR (€), SEASONALLY 
ADJUSTED 
 
 
Source:  Earnings and Labour Costs Quarterly, Central Statistics Office. 
Note:  The y-axis on the LHS scale has a very low range of values.  
 
Looking at the difference between public and private pay, public sector 
employees experienced an annual increase of 4.4 per cent to €21.65 per hour 
while private sector employees experienced an annual increase of 2.7 per cent to 
€29.77 per hour. For the public sector, weekly earnings ranged from €844.42 
among regional bodies to €1,232.53 per week for An Garda Síochána in Q4 2018. 
Private sector earnings ranged from €360.73 per week in Accommodation and 
food service activities to €1,175.46 per week in Information and communication. 
Irregular earnings – bonuses which are not paid regularly at each pay period – 
were highest in the public sector amongst An Garda Síochána at an average of 
€159.94 per week. In the private sector they were highest for Information and 
communication workers averaging €165 per week.  
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FIGURE 48 HOURLY EARNINGS BY SECTOR, Q4 2018 (€) 
 
Source:  Earnings and Labour Costs Quarterly, Central Statistics Office. 
 
Labour market forecasts 
As the Irish economy is expected to grow over the next two years, we expect 
further improvements in the labour market. However, as the labour market 
approaches full employment, the rate of unemployment is expected to decrease 
at a slower pace than 2018. The unemployment rate is expected to average  
5.2 per cent in 2019 and 4.8 per cent in 2020. Employment is set to exceed  
2.3 million by the end of 2019, increasing to 2.36 million by the end of 2020. As 
the demand for labour increases over the next two years, so too will the wage 
rate. We expect nominal earnings to rise by 3.2 per cent in 2019 and by 3.4 per 
cent in 2020. 
 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
Irish taxation receipts in 2018 witnessed a significant increase. While all items, 
with the exception of excise duty, experienced increases, it was the surge in 
corporation tax receipts which attracted most attention. Corporation tax receipts 
grew by almost 24 per cent year-on-year; this compares with the expected 
increase by the Department of Finance at the onset of 2018 of just under 4 per 
cent. While the contribution of corporation taxes is the most notable element of 
Exchequer receipts, it is worth pointing out that other categories, which are more 
reflective of underlying economic activity such as income tax and VAT, also 
experienced sizeable annual increases of 6 and 6.8 per cent respectively. Stamp 
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duty also experienced a sizeable increase with revenues growing by over 30 per 
cent for the year. 
 
Figure 49 illustrates the annual changes in taxation returns for the last three 
years for the main tax categories as well as the overall total amount. 
 
FIGURE 49 ANNUAL CHANGES IN MAJOR TAX SUB-COMPONENTS (%)  
 
Source:  Department of Finance and QEC calculations. 
 
Further evidence of the strong underlying performance of the economy can be 
observed from the increased contributions to the Social Insurance Fund through 
pay related social insurance; these returns, which are closely correlated with 
developments in the Irish labour market, increased by 5.2 per cent in 2018.  
 
Notwithstanding the increases in taxation items associated with underlying 
growth in the economy, the significant spike in corporation tax receipts suggests 
caution should be exercised in assessing the state of the fiscal accounts. In Figure 
50 we compare the actual growth rate in corporation tax returns with the 
expected or ‘profile’ forecasts issued by the Department of Finance at the onset 
of each year 
 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2016 2017 2018
Excise Duty Stamps Income Tax Corporation Tax Valued Added Tax Total
58 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Sp r i ng  20 19   
FIGURE 50 ANNUAL ACTUAL AND EXPECTED GROWTH RATES IN CORPORATION TAX 
RECEIPTS (%): 2005-2018 
 
Source:  Department of Finance and QEC calculations. 
 
The graph illustrates how, since the start of the general economic recovery in 
2013, the rate of increase in corporation taxes has been underestimated relative 
to profile levels, with the differences in 2015 and 2018 being particularly 
pronounced. In terms of absolute amounts, this means that for corporation taxes 
alone, the Exchequer has been in receipt of over €5.5 billion of unanticipated or 
‘windfall’ returns between 2013 and 2018. This would be over 10 per cent of total 
taxation receipts in 2018.  
 
As a counterfactual exercise to demonstrate the impact of the corporation tax 
windfalls, we re-estimate the general government balance (GGB) with the profile 
estimate of corporation tax as opposed to the actual level. All other components 
of the budget are kept the same. Overall, instead of a balance of -0.3 per cent of 
GDP, the ‘windfall’ in corporation taxes results in a budget surplus of 0.1 per cent 
of GDP. This illustrates how assessments of the country’s public finances are 
increasingly sensitive to unanticipated changes in corporation tax receipts. 
 
Figure 51 presents the debt-to-output ratio for both GDP and the new GNI* 
measure. While both trends indicate that Ireland’s debt sustainability is clearly 
improving, a significant difference is evident between the GDP and GNI* output 
denominators. 
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FIGURE 51 DEBT-TO-GDP AND GNI*RATIOS (%) 
 
Source:  QEC calculations. 
  
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
GDP GNI*
60 |  Quar t er ly  Eco nomi c  C omme nt ary  –  Sp r i ng  20 19   
 
General Assessment 
 
From a growth perspective, the Irish economy sustained its excellent 
performance in 2018. While headline estimates of GDP are significantly impacted 
by the performance of a relatively small number of multinational firms, the 
increase in taxation receipts (apart from those in the corporation category), along 
with the continued expansion in total employment, illustrates the strong 
momentum in the domestic economy.  
 
However, the outlook for 2019 is characterised by an unprecedented level of 
uncertainty, particularly in terms of Ireland’s relationship with external trading 
partners. The continued lack of clarity over the nature of the UK’s withdrawal 
from the European Union is the most immediate pressing risk to the Irish 
economy. Researchers at the ESRI and the Department of Finance have 
conducted an in-depth assessment of the relative impacts of both a ‘no-deal’ 
Brexit, and the implications of the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and 
the EU, compared to a baseline of the UK maintaining EU membership. The work 
published in a paper to the Commentary (Bergin et al., 2019) is a novel 
combination of both macroeconometric analysis using COSMO and more 
granular, microeconomic research presented in Lawless (2018a), Lawless (2018b) 
and Morgenroth and Lawless (2016).31 This allows for arguably the most 
comprehensive examination of the impacts of Brexit on the Irish economy to 
date.  
 
The results clearly point to a long-term loss of output and employment for the 
Irish economy vis-à-vis a no-Brexit case. The accumulation of this loss in economic 
activity will adversely impact the resources available to the State in addressing 
key infrastructural challenges such as those in the housing and health areas.  
 
The prospect of a no-deal Brexit also leads to significant variability around short-
term forecasts for the Irish economy; under a baseline, no-Brexit case, we believe 
the Irish economy would grow by 3.8 per cent in 2019 and 3.2 per cent in 2020. 
However, a no-deal scenario with significant disruptions would reduce these GDP 
 
                                                          
 
31  Lawless, M. (2016a). Intermediate goods inputs and the UK content of Irish goods exports, Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI). 
Lawless, M. (2016b). ‘Irish-UK Services Trade and Brexit’, Working Paper No. WP595, Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI). 
Lawless, M. and E. Morgenroth (2018). ‘Brexit and Irish Consumers’, Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Article, 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). 
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growth rates to 1.2 and 2.4 per cent respectively. Such potential variation in the 
short-term outlook underscores the need for prudence to be exercised, 
particularly in relation to the public finances. The recent issue concerning the 
increased costs on the current and capital Health budget, including the Children’s 
Hospital, along with the potential for increased public pay demands following the 
recent agreement reached with the nurses’ unions, highlights the pressures the 
public finances are already under.  
 
Aside from Brexit, it is clear that the international climate for the domestic 
economy has deteriorated somewhat since the last Commentary. A number of 
factors are responsible for this with the slowdown in the recovery of the Euro 
Area and an escalation of vulnerabilities in the Chinese economy being to the 
fore. The impact of these vulnerabilities on the global economy is exacerbated by 
the uncertainty concerning China’s trading relationship with the United States. 
 
Notwithstanding the uncertainties on the external front, our first forecast for 
2020 in the present Commentary indicates that the unemployment rate in the 
economy will fall to approximately 4.7 per cent. Historically, this suggests the 
domestic labour market would be operating at full capacity at that stage. As 
noted in the previous Commentary, given the present state of the Irish labour 
market, significant inward net migration is required to meet the investment 
priorities such as the increase in housing supply and the infrastructure priorities 
identified by Government.  
 
A medium-term risk to the Irish economy relates to the normalisation of ECB 
monetary policy. Given the indebted nature of the Irish economy, the legacy of 
the crash still poses a financial threat to certain households if repayment burdens 
rise with policy rate increases. The present Commentary contains a Special Article 
examining the issue of mortgage arrears in the Irish market. In Fahy et al. (2019) 
the impact on the Irish mortgage market of the potential normalisation of Euro 
Area monetary policy is examined. Using data from the Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (SILC), the findings indicate an increase in policy rates of 100 
basis points would lead to a 50 basis points increase in new arrears cases. While 
the market is in a better position to withstand such shocks given the increase in 
incomes and labour market developments, this would inevitably cause challenges 
for many borrowers and raise the level of mortgage arrears. 
 
While the disproportionate impact of a small number of multinationals on 
headline Irish economic data is most readily observable in terms of GDP, it is clear 
that corporation tax receipts are also susceptible to the activities of a small 
number of firms. In 2018, corporation tax receipts increased by over 26 per cent, 
while the expected or profile increase was just less than 4 per cent. The 
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difference between expected and actual corporation tax receipts, as illustrated in 
the public finances section of the Commentary, resulted in Government running a 
mild surplus rather than a deficit on the general government balance. This is the 
first time the Government has run a general surplus since 2007. While a surplus is 
a positive development, the sensitivity of key fiscal metrics, such as the 
Government balance, to the activities of a small number of firms is an ongoing 
concern. It highlights the particular vulnerability of the Irish economy to 
international developments and argues for domestic policymakers being more 
cautious in their fiscal objectives than they would otherwise be. The public 
finances section of the Commentary estimates that the Exchequer has been in 
receipt of over €5.5 billion in ‘windfall’ receipts from corporation taxes alone 
between 2013 and 2018. The scale of this windfall argues for a special strategy to 
be employed in using such funds, e.g. should any windfall estimate be diverted 
purely to funding capital-based projects or towards the ‘Rainy Day fund’?  
 
 
 
 
 DETAILED FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A1 EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 192.9 8.0 11.9 208.2 4.3 3.3 217.3 4.4 3.2 226.9 
Tourism 5.0 5.3 3.9 5.2 3.2 3.2 5.4 3.2 3.2 5.6 
Other Services 154.7 10.1 5.3 170.3 7.3 6.4 182.7 7.2 6.1 195.8 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 8.9 8.9 383.8 5.6 4.3 405.3 5.6 4.4 428.2 
FISM Adjustment 0.0     0.0     -0.7     -0.5 
Adjusted Exports 352.6 8.9 8.9 383.8 5.4 4.3 404.6 5.6 4.4 427.7 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 INVESTMENT 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 5.4 35.0 24.4 7.3 16.5 19.2 8.5 22.4 19.8 10.4 
Other Building 14.3 19.5 12.3 17.1 17.1 11.0 20.0 17.8 12.0 23.5 
Transfer Costs 1.2 36.7 24.5 1.6 8.2 3.0 1.7 6.5 2.4 1.8 
Building and Construction 21.8 24.3 15.9 27.1 16.4 12.7 31.5 18.4 13.7 37.3 
Machinery and Equipment 52.4 10.8 7.3 52.4 6.8 4.7 55.9 7.3 5.0 60.0 
Total Investment 69.0 15.1 9.8 87.4 10.0 7.5 87.4 11.3 8.0 97.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FORECAST TABLE A3 PERSONAL INCOME 
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture 0.7 2.5 0.0 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.7 
Non-Agricultural 85.7 5.9 5.0 90.7 6.1 5.5 96.2 5.6 5.4 101.7 
Rental Income 10.0 7.6 0.8 10.8 7.4 0.8 11.6 7.2 0.8 12.4 
Other Income 15.7 7.9 1.2 17.0 4.7 0.8 17.8 2.4 0.4 18.2 
Total Income Received 112.1 6.3 7.1 119.2 6.0 7.1 126.3 5.3 6.7 133.0 
Current Transfers 8.6 -6.6 -0.6 8.0 -8.8 -0.7 7.3 -10.0 -0.7 6.6 
Gross Personal Income 120.7 5.4 6.5 127.2 5.0 6.4 133.6 4.5 6.0 139.6 
Taxes on Income and Wealth -22.2 9.9 -2.2 -24.3 4.1 -1.0 -25.3 5.0 -1.3 -26.6 
Personal Disposable Income 98.6 4.4 4.3 102.9 5.3 5.4 108.3 4.3 4.7 113.0 
Consumption 93.8 4.3 4.0 97.8 3.9 3.8 101.7 4.1 4.2 105.9 
Personal Savings 11.4 7.5 0.9 12.3 17.5 2.1 14.4 5.9 0.9 15.3 
Savings Ratio 11.2   11.4   12.7   12.9 
Average Personal Tax Rate 0.18   0.19   0.19   0.19 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES  
 
2017 % change in 2018 2018 % change in 2019 2019 % change in 2020 2020 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 85.2 15.6 14.4 98.5 9.6 8.5 108.0 8.8 7.2 117.5 
Tourism 5.8 8.8 7.8 6.3 6.4 4.8 6.7 6.2 4.4 7.1 
Other Services 172.2 4.2 3.2 179.5 7.2 5.8 192.4 7.1 5.5 206.0 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 8.0 7.0 284.4 8.0 6.3 306.3 8.0 6.1 330.6 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0   -0.7   -0.8 
Adjusted Imports 263.3 8.0 7.0 284.4 7.7 6.3 305.6 7.7 6.1 329.8 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 352.6 383.8 404.7 427.5 
Imports of Goods and Services 263.3 284.4 306.3 330.6 
Net Factor Payments -59.8 -65.4 -75.6 -79.4 
Net Transfers -4.6 -5.1 -5.6 -6.1 
Balance on Current Account 24.9 29.0 17.0 12.1 
As a % of GNP 10.7 11.5 6.5 4.4 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, ANNUAL AVERAGE 
 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
 
‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 
Agriculture 110.4 107.4 105.0 105.0 
Industry 412.0 423.2 433.5 444.2 
Of which: Construction 128.8 143.4 147.9 151.5 
Services 1,664.1 1,719.2 1,762.7 1,805.8 
Total at Work 2,194.2 2,249.8 2,307.1 2,355.6 
Unemployed 157.7 145.2 125.5 119.7 
Labour Force 2,352.0 2,394.9 2,432.6 2,475.2 
Unemployment Rate, % 6.7 5.7 5.2 4.8 
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IRELAND AND BREXIT: MODELLING THE IMPACT OF DEAL AND NO-
DEAL SCENARIOS1  
 
* Adele Bergin, Philip Economides, Abian Garcia-Rodriguez and 
Gavin Murphy 
ABSTRACT 
This Article attempts to quantify the macroeconomic impact of Brexit on the Irish 
economy. Given both the political and economic uncertainty, we consider a range 
of alternative scenarios. We focus on the most well understood channels through 
which Brexit will affect Ireland, namely though lower trade, incorporating the 
impact of tariff and non-tariff measures, and the potentially positive impact of 
FDI diversion to Ireland. Our approach, and the main contribution of this paper, is 
to build up estimates of each of these channels from a range of recent micro-
economic studies, so our estimates are anchored in the empirical literature. We 
then use these micro-estimates to calibrate macro scenarios; specifically we 
generate alternative paths for the UK and international economy using the 
NiGEM global model and assess the impact on Ireland using the COSMO model. 
Overall, in each scenario, the level of Irish output is permanently below where it 
otherwise would have been were the UK to decide to remain in the EU. 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the result of the UK referendum in June 2016 and the invocation of 
Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union in March 2017, the UK is due to 
leave the EU at the end of March 2019. While a Withdrawal Agreement and 
Political Declaration were agreed between the UK and EU in November 2018, the 
UK House of Commons failed to approve it in January 2019. At the time of 
writing, the political impasse means that there is a wide range of possible 
outcomes. In addition to the heightened political uncertainty, there is also 
uncertainty as to the economic impact of Brexit in whatever form it eventually 
 
                                                          
 
1  This research was conducted under the joint Department of Finance, Revenue Commissioners and ESRI Research 
Programme on The Macroeconomy, Taxation and Banking. We are grateful to the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research, London, for providing access to their detailed Brexit simulation results and for advice in using their 
global macro-econometric model, NiGEM. The authors would like to thank Martina Lawless, Seamus McGuinness, 
Kieran McQuinn, Brendan O’Connor and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version of the paper. We 
would also like to thank Iulia Siedschlag for helpful discussions on the expected FDI impacts. The views presented in 
this Article are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of either the Department of Finance or the 
Economic and Social Research Institute.  
* Adele Bergin is a Senior Research Officer at the Economic and Social Research Institute, Philip Economides is a 
Research Assistant at the Economic and Social Research Institute, Abian Garcia-Rodriguez is a Research Officer at the 
Economic and Social Research Institute and Gavin Murphy is an Economist at the Department of Finance. 
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takes as there is no precedent of a country leaving a major trading block such as 
the EU.  
 
While there is a strong consensus that leaving the EU will have a negative impact 
on the UK, there is no consensus on the duration, composition or scale of the 
impact on the UK economy. Empirical studies make different assumptions around 
each of these components so, even if they are considering broadly similar overall 
scenarios, there can be variation in estimates of the ultimate economic impact. 
 
This Article attempts to quantify the macroeconomic impact of Brexit on the Irish 
economy under a range of scenarios. In terms of the impact, existing evidence 
indicates that Ireland will be hit relatively hard compared to other EU countries 
given its close economic relationship with the UK. Our previous analysis of Brexit 
(Bergin et al., 2017b) used scenarios from the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research (NIESR) based on their NiGEM global econometric model to 
assess the impact of Brexit on Ireland’s trading partners and the wider 
international economy, and then examined the effect of these changes in the 
international economy on Ireland using the COSMO model of the Irish economy. 
We use the same overall modelling framework in this Article but we follow a 
different approach. We focus on the most well understood channels through 
which Brexit will affect Ireland, namely though lower trade incorporating the 
impact of tariff and non-tariff measures, and the potentially positive impact of 
FDI diversion to Ireland. Our approach, and the main contribution of this Article, 
is to build up estimates of each of these channels from a range of recent micro-
economic studies, so our estimates are anchored in the empirical literature. We 
then use these micro-estimates to calibrate macro scenarios; specifically we 
generate alternative paths for the UK and international economy using the 
NiGEM global model and assess the impact on Ireland using the COSMO model. 
 
Given both the political and economic uncertainty, it is prudent to consider a 
range of scenarios. We consider three scenarios which we describe as Deal, No-
Deal and Disorderly No-Deal. To estimate the economic impact of each scenario, 
we compare them to a counterfactual scenario where the UK remains in the EU. 
In the Deal scenario, the UK makes an orderly agreed exit from the EU. This 
involves a transition period covering the years 2019 and 2020, and a free trade 
agreement between the UK and the EU27 thereafter.2 In the No-Deal scenario, 
the UK exits the EU without a deal but there is an orderly period of adjustment 
for trade. Ultimately, WTO tariff arrangements will apply to goods trade, there 
will be non-tariff measures, and services trade will also be negatively impacted. In 
 
                                                          
 
2  The Deal scenario is based on the Withdrawal Agreement wherein the short-run impact of Brexit is more limited. This 
scenario is also broadly consistent with a short extension of Article 50.  
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the Disorderly No-Deal scenario, the UK exits the EU without a deal and there is 
an additional disruption to trade in the short-run, above that considered in the 
No-Deal scenario. In each scenario, some of the negative trade impact is partially 
offset by FDI being diverted to Ireland. 
 
Overall, our scenario results suggest that in the long run (after ten years), the 
level of real output in the Irish economy would be 2.6 per cent, 4.8 per cent and 
5.0 per cent lower in the Deal, No-Deal and Disorderly No-Deal scenarios, 
respectively, compared to a situation where the UK stays in the EU. The 
magnitude of each of these shocks is considerable and will have negative effects 
throughout the economy on the household sector, the labour market, firms and 
the public finances.  
 
There is uncertainty around when the ultimate trade and FDI impacts of Brexit 
will impact the UK and Ireland. As such, there is arguably more uncertainty about 
the short-run impact of Brexit as it depends crucially on how smooth any 
transition to the new trading arrangements will be. Our scenario results indicate 
that by 2020, the level of real output in the Irish economy would be 0.6 per cent, 
1.2 per cent and 2.4 per cent lower in the Deal, No-Deal and Disorderly No-Deal 
scenarios, respectively, compared to a situation where the UK remains in the EU. 
 
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
existing literature on the impact of Brexit from both an international and Irish 
perspective, Section 3 describes our approach to estimating the impact of Brexit 
on Ireland, Section 4 discusses the macroeconomic impacts of each scenario and 
Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
EXISTING EVIDENCE 
The size of the UK economy and its substantial interlinkages with the European 
and broader international economy suggest that the impact of Brexit could be 
considerable. Since before the 2016 referendum, most research on Brexit has 
focussed on the impact for the UK. Many studies have been macroeconomic in 
nature and, while they have employed different approaches and assumptions, 
there is almost a complete consensus that Brexit will reduce economic activity in 
the UK below where it otherwise would have been. More recently, there has also 
been a surge in the micro-economic literature examining how Brexit may impact 
the UK and other economies. These studies examine, for example, how tariff and 
non-tariff measures affect trade and can take account of differences in tariffs and 
non-tariff measures at a much more granular level, in terms of products and 
sectors, than macroeconomic models generally allow for. This expansion and 
deepening of the literature ultimately means that there is a better understanding 
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of how Brexit may impact the UK and other economies, and also that there are 
more reliable estimates available that can be used to calibrate scenarios in 
macroeconomic models. This section briefly discusses this literature and focusses 
on the latest studies that attempt to capture the channels through which Brexit 
will impact the UK and other economies. 
2.1  UK macroeconomic findings 
Following the UK’s vote to leave the EU, a significant body of research has sought 
to estimate the potential consequences of Brexit for the UK economy. The NiGEM 
macro-econometric model of the NIESR has been used in many studies including 
by NIESR itself, HM Treasury, and the OECD. As a multi-country model it is suited 
to modelling the potential Brexit related changes in trade etc. Simulations using 
other modelling approaches have also been employed including Computable 
General Equilibrium models (LSE/CEP), DSGE models (European Commission), and 
Bayesian estimated models (IMF). 
 
Given the ongoing uncertainty surrounding the future relationship between the 
UK and the EU, the standard approach in these studies is to present a range of 
scenarios. In earlier Brexit studies, these scenarios broadly reflected three 
potential outcomes. First, the UK would agree to join the European Economic 
Area (EEA) and maintain access to the EU Single Market. A second possibility 
explored was that the UK and EU would form a free trade agreement. Third, the 
UK and EU would impose a standard WTO arrangement whereby ‘most favoured 
nation’ (MFN) tariff terms are applied, in a situation where both parties fail to 
reach an agreement (see, for further discussion, Sampson, 2017; HM Treasury, 
2016; Dhingra and Sampson, 2016). Since November 2018, the proposed 
Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration on plans for the future UK-EU 
relationship has enabled more recent studies to distinguish between a deal 
outcome, as set out under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, and differing 
forms of a ‘no-deal’ outcome, where WTO tariff rates are applied to UK trade. 
Given the proximity to the exit date, recent no-deal analyses have focused on the 
potential impact of a disorderly Brexit and the additional trade frictions that 
could be introduced (e.g. Bank of England, 2018).  
 
In modelling these scenarios, studies vary in terms of the range of economic 
channels that are analysed. While the trade and FDI impacts are the most 
important, consideration has also been given to the potential impacts of 
uncertainty in the short-run, to productivity impacts associated with lower trade 
and FDI, to migration and to EU budget contributions. Notwithstanding 
differences in modelling techniques, variation in scenario estimates of the overall 
economic impact generally reflect different assumptions around the timing and 
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magnitude of changes in each of the modelled components (Tetlow and 
Stojanovic, 2018).  
 
With respect to time horizons, the majority of studies on the impact of Brexit on 
the UK have tended to focus on the long-run impact on the UK economy (Tetlow 
and Stojanovic, 2018). From a modelling perspective, this is understandable as 
the evidence points towards changes in trade and FDI patterns in the longer term, 
although there is no consensus on the timing of these changes or whether the 
scale of these changes will be gradual or more sudden in nature. Many of the 
short-term impacts of Brexit are primarily driven by uncertainty including 
exchange rate fluctuations which are difficult to accurately quantify.  
 
The short-term estimates of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy suggest 
significant deviations from the baseline of ‘remain’. By 2020, deviations in the 
level of real UK GDP range from -1.7 per cent under a Norway-like (EEA) deal 
(Ebell and Warren, 2016) to -5.6 per cent in the case of no deal (IMF, 2016). A 
more recent NIESR study, accounting for the proposed terms of the Withdrawal 
Agreement, sits within this range at -2.2 per cent by 2020, following a two-year 
transition period (Hantzsche et al., 2018).  
 
A strong consensus has also emerged regarding the negative effect the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU will have on its economy in the longer term (generally 
considered to be after ten to 15 years) (HM Treasury, 2016; HM Government, 
2018; IMF, 2018b; Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; Hantzsche et al., 2018; 
Vandenbussche et al., 2019). Table 1 shows the estimated long-run impacts range 
from -0.1 per cent under a ‘liberal Customs Union’ (Oxford Economics, 2016) 
to -10.5 per cent under a ‘disorderly’ no-deal scenario (Bank of England, 2018). 
Among free trade agreement (FTA) scenarios, the average long-term loss to UK 
GDP relative to a remain baseline is 3.7 per cent. Various WTO (no-deal) scenarios 
indicate an average relative loss of 6.0 per cent.  
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TABLE 1  COMPARISON OF RECENT STUDIES ON THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF BREXIT ON THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Study Scenario GDP % Change Relative to Base 
Bank of England (2018) 
Deal + FTA -1.5 
Deal + Backstop -3.8 
No Deal -7.8 
Disorderly No Deal -10.5 
HM Treasury (2016) 
EEA -3.8 
FTA -6.2 
WTO -7.5 
HM Government (2018) 
EEA -1.4 
FTA -4.9 
No Deal -7.6 
IMF (2018) 
FTA -3.1 
WTO -6.2 
Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) 
WTO/FTA (Optimistic) -2.7 
WTO/FTA (Central) -5.1 
WTO/FTA (Pessimistic) -7.7 
NIESR (Hantzsche et al., 2018) 
Deal + FTA -3.9 
Deal + Backstop -2.8 
No Deal -5.5 
Oxford Economics (2016) 
Liberal Customs Union -0.1 
FTA -2.8 
WTO -3.9 
Vandenbussche et al. (2019) 
Norway Deal -1.2 
No Deal -4.5 
 
2.2  Irish macroeconomic findings 
Much like the research on the impact of Brexit for the UK, an increasing number 
of studies have examined its potential implications for the Irish economy. 
Similarly, a consistent finding is that Ireland will be negatively affected relative to 
a situation where the UK remained in the EU. Moreover, international 
comparative studies indicate that the impact for Ireland could be more 
pronounced relative to other EU countries (Vandenbussche et al., 2019; 
Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; IMF, 2016; Dhingra et al., 2016a). This particularly high 
degree of exposure is not surprising given how deeply integrated the Irish and UK 
economies are. In 2015, Irish exports to the UK accounted for 14 per cent of total 
cross-border goods exports and 20 per cent of total service exports. Imports from 
the UK are also significant, representing 26 per cent of total cross-border goods 
imports and 10 per cent of service imports. The Irish economy has also benefitted 
from a long established common labour market with the UK, predating EU 
membership.  
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More recently, Chen et al. (2018) examine relative differences in the potential 
regional impacts of Brexit and they find that among the EU28 Member States, 
only regions in Ireland face local GDP exposure levels similar to UK regions.3 The 
study suggests that primary activities such as agriculture, forestry and fishing are 
more at risk in the Border, Midland and Western region of Ireland whereas the 
construction and services sectors are more exposed in the Southern and Eastern 
region of Ireland.  
 
Focusing on the potential macroeconomic impact, Table 2 summarises the 
existing findings on the long-term (generally considered to be after ten to 15 
years) impact of Brexit on Ireland.4 Bergin et al. (2017b) using the Irish 
macroeconomic model (COSMO) while drawing on results from Ebell and Warren 
(2016), find that under an EEA scenario Ireland’s output is reduced by 2.3 per 
cent relative to a no-Brexit scenario; whereas a WTO scenario would result in a 
relative reduction of output by 3.8 per cent. This compares to an estimated 3.2 
per cent decline in GDP under a no-deal scenario published by the Central Bank of 
Ireland (2016) using a Bayesian Vector Autoregression model. Copenhagen 
Economics (2016) using a CGE model produce estimates at the upper end of the 
spectrum, with the loss in GDP ranging from 2.8 per cent under an EEA 
agreement to 7 per cent under a ‘No-Deal’ simulation.  
 
In the context of heightened concerns of a potential UK exit without any deal or 
transition arrangement, the Central Bank of Ireland (2019) simulated the 
implications of a disorderly Brexit on Irish GDP, relative to a baseline scenario of 
continued EU membership. In the first year alone, a 4 percentage point reduction 
in GDP growth occurs. In the long run, GDP is estimated to fall by 6 per cent as a 
result of a disorderly Brexit relative to a remain scenario. Arriola et al. (2018), in a 
two-stage process, use their general equilibrium trade model (METRO) to 
quantify the impacts of tariffs and non-tariff measures under a WTO scenario on 
trade before incorporating these effects into NiGEM to establish the 
macroeconomic impact on Ireland. They estimate a 2 to 2.5 per cent relative 
decline in Irish GDP over the long run. 
 
 
                                                          
 
3  Members are disaggregated regionally at the NUTS 2 level, resulting in 28 members being split into 252 regions. 
National levels of GDP exposure to Brexit find that trade-related exposure of the UK economy is 4.6 times greater 
than the rest of the EU whereas in Ireland’s case it is only 1.2 times greater.  
4  These studies differ with respect to both baseline scenarios and the assumptions underpinning alternative Brexit 
outcomes. As a result, the impacts are not directly comparable and only enable establishing a range of potential 
impacts.  
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TABLE 2 COMPARISON OF RECENT STUDIES ON THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF BREXIT ON THE 
IRELAND 
Study Scenario GDP % Change Relative to Base 
Arriola et al. (2018) No Deal -2.3
Bergin et al. (2017b) 
EEA -2.3
FTA -2.7
WTO (No Deal) -3.8
Copenhagen Economics (2016) 
EEA -2.8
FTA -4.3
No Deal -7.0
Conefrey et al. (2018) No Deal -3.2
Central Bank of Ireland (2019) Disorderly No Deal -6.0
IMF (2018a) 
FTA -2.5
No Deal -4.0
Vandenbussche et al. (2019) 
Norway Deal -1.3
No Deal -5.7
2.3 Recent literature: trade impacts 
The recent focus on estimating micro-founded impacts of tariff and non-tariff 
measures on trade patterns is an important development in the Brexit literature 
(Lawless and Morgenroth, 2019; Cappariello, 2017; Arriola et al., 2018). These 
approaches generally seek to identify the economic costs of Brexit through 
directly applying trade frictions (such as tariffs and non-tariff measures) to micro-
level data. Such estimates are likely to be more appropriate than the use of 
gravity model estimates to gauge the size of trade impacts which have been 
regularly used in macro-modelling exercises. 
Gravity models estimate how much additional trade in goods and services 
happens between EU members (compared with countries that are not members) 
while accounting for differences in the size of economies, distance and other 
relevant factors. These studies generally find a positive effect on trade associated 
with EEA and EU membership. To calibrate a trade shock in macro-models, 
studies often simply reverse the value of these estimates. As summarised in 
Hantzsche et al. (2018), gravity model estimates suggest a reduction in bilateral 
UK-EU goods trade of between 25 and 65 per cent, and a reduction in UK-EU 
services trade of 19 to 65 per cent. This is a very wide range of estimates. 
Although the range largely reflects the particular trade agreement that is 
assumed and difference in samples, there is often wide variation in estimates of 
specific types of trade agreements (and the range of estimates associated with 
different types of trade agreements sometimes overlap). It can be argued that 
this approach lacks the precision needed to make a convincing estimate of the 
impact of EU membership on trade. Furthermore, assuming that the impact of 
leaving the EU is symmetric (i.e. reversing the value of estimates from gravity 
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models implying that all of the estimated trade gain associated with EU 
membership is lost) may excessively simplify the impact of increased trade 
frictions.  
In this context, Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) provide an important alternative 
approach to quantifying the potential product, sectoral and aggregate impacts of 
applying WTO tariffs on UK-EU Member States’ bilateral trade flows. Under the 
assumption that the full tariff amount would be incorporated into the price, they 
show that the impacts of tariffs significantly differ across countries due to 
variation in sectoral trade exposures.5 In their analysis, they show that WTO 
tariffs vary significantly by product, ranging from zero up to 75 per cent in the 
case of water pipe tobacco. At a sectoral level the average tariff rate ranges 
between zero and 50 per cent, with the Food, Clothes, and Tobacco sectoral 
aggregates in particular being highly exposed. 
In terms of aggregate impacts, Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) find that EU to UK 
goods exports would be reduced by 30 per cent while UK to EU goods exports 
decline by 22 per cent. Interestingly, while Ireland makes up 5 per cent of UK 
imports, it would represent close to 20 per cent of the total EU tariff impacts 
under a WTO MFN tariff scenario. The projected fall in Irish goods exports to the 
UK is 31 per cent (4 per cent fall in total Irish exports) and UK goods exports to 
Ireland decline by 28 per cent (1.5 per cent fall in total Irish imports). In terms of 
trade losses, they find that agricultural and food products, textiles and traditional 
manufacturing sectors would be most affected.  
Notwithstanding the importance of assessing the impact of tariffs, the ending of 
the UK’s EU membership will have significant implications for the non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) including legal, regulatory and administrative terms under 
which goods and services can be traded. Integration of the EU Single Market has 
seen significant agreement by Member States over the years on standards and 
regulations in regards to, for example, product technical and safety specifications, 
and health compliance reviews. This has been coupled with agreement on 
administrative processes including customs declarations and documentary 
compliance, and border inspections. Membership of the Single Market supports 
greater trade integration, by reducing trade costs through for instance, the 
5 It should be noted that quotas on particular imports determine the effective tariff rate. Any within-quota imports 
face lower tariffs, meaning that the overall effective tariff would likely be lower than the WTO MFN rate. In the 
absence of the UK’s WTO tariff schedule and given that the UK is unlikely to impose EU quotas (due to its smaller size 
than the EU and its trade deficit in products such as food and pharmaceuticals), this particular analysis has taken the 
conservative option of applying full tariffs to all trade. As such, the tariff rates imposed should be considered an 
upper bound to the median tariff rate applied in that analysis. 
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streamlining of customs processes, and by better regulatory alignment which can 
facilitate the elimination of market failures arising from information asymmetries.  
 
Studies seeking to quantify NTM effects, including Lawless (2010) and Byrne and 
Rice (2018), use variations of a gravity model approach to estimate the impact of 
non-tariff measures on sectoral trade flows. Byrne and Rice (2018) show that the 
average border time increase associated with leaving the Customs Union is 4.5 
hours. This would equate to a 90 per cent increase on current UK waiting times 
for imports. This is estimated to lead to a 9.6 per cent decline in goods trade 
between the Ireland and the UK. From an Irish perspective, these transport 
waiting times are a particularly relevant concern as a considerable proportion of 
Irish goods (measured in terms of volume) are shipped to (53 per cent) and from 
(11 per cent) the continent via the UK landbridge (Lawless and Morgenroth, 
2017). 
2.4  Recent literature: FDI impacts 
While the UK’s exit from the EU will adversely affect Irish trading activity with 
significant negative implications for the wider economy, a strong argument can 
be made that the impact will be offset in part as a result of FDI being diverted 
into Ireland. As discussed in Barrett et al. (2015), Ireland continues to be one of 
the most important destinations for FDI in the world. This is attributed to factors 
such as the presence of a highly educated English speaking labour force, limited 
barriers to trade and investment due to EU membership and trade agreements 
with other non-EU countries, a business friendly regulatory environment and a 
simple corporate tax system with relatively low tax rates. To the extent that these 
attributes are closely shared with the UK, it opens up the potential opportunity 
for firms to relocate investment here in order to remain within the EU or 
undertake new investment that might otherwise have located in the UK (Lawless 
and Morgenroth, 2016). 
 
Compared to the trade literature, there is limited research to draw on in terms of 
quantifying the potential impact of the UK’s decision to exit the EU on the inflow 
of FDI into the UK. Ebell and Warren (2016) identify three main approaches that 
provide useful estimates which can be used to quantify potential FDI inflow 
effects under alternative EU UK trading arrangements. These include gravity 
models, synthetic cohorts analyses and regression based analyses assessing the 
relationship between FDI and openness. Most studies appear to indicate that UK 
inward FDI will reduce by in the region of 20 to 30 per cent, (e.g. Ramasamy and 
Yeung (2010), 20-27 per cent; Bruno et al. (2016), 12-28 per cent; HM Treasury 
(2016), 26 per cent; Campos and Coricelli (2015), 25-30 per cent; Straathof et al. 
(2008) estimates a 22 per cent intra-EU FDI loss and an 11 per cent non-EU loss). 
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However, findings in Fournier (2015) would suggest a greater band of uncertainty 
around the potential impact of Brexit on UK FDI (i.e. 10 to 45 per cent). 
 
In terms of gauging the impact for Ireland, Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) 
suggest that the stock of Irish FDI would increase by 7.3 per cent assuming a 
reduction in the UK FDI stock of 27 per cent which is allocated in line with 
Ireland’s current non-UK EU FDI share of 6.9 per cent. 
SCENARIOS 
Our analysis is focused on the most well understood potential impacts of Brexit, 
namely on trade and FDI. The scenarios are built up from estimates in the 
empirical literature of the magnitude of the effects on trade, incorporating the 
imposition of tariffs and non-tariff measures, and on FDI. In contrast, our 
previous analysis of the potential impact of Brexit (Bergin et al., 2017b) drew on 
macro scenarios from NIESR (Ebell and Warren, 2016) and did not include the 
effects of potential FDI diversion to Ireland, whereas in this Article we use recent 
micro-evidence to calibrate macro scenarios in NiGEM and assess the impact on 
Ireland using the COSMO model. While these effects may not be exhaustive, 
there is a consensus that these are the most important impacts. In this section, 
we describe the particular assumptions that we use to model the main impacts of 
Brexit on the Irish economy. 
3.1  Approach  
A key question concerns the range of possible outcomes for the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU. At the time of writing, there is still 
considerable uncertainty as to this future relationship. This study focuses on 
three main scenarios, which we describe as Deal, No-Deal and Disorderly  
No-Deal, while acknowledging that other outcomes are possible. In order to 
determine the total potential impact of Brexit on Ireland, we compare these 
scenarios to a counterfactual or hypothetical base case where the UK stays in the 
EU.6  
 
In the Deal scenario, a deal between the UK and EU is agreed which includes a 
transition period until the end of 2020 during which time the UK continues to 
abide by all existing EU rules and regulations. In the longer term a free trade 
agreement is agreed between the UK and the EU27. This scenario is based on the 
Withdrawal Agreement. While the Withdrawal Agreement does not fully specify 
 
                                                          
 
6  To the extent that existing forecasts, such as those regularly undertaken by the ESRI, Department of Finance Central 
Bank, etc., have already incorporated some Brexit scenarios, directly adjusting these forecasts for the impacts 
described in this paper would constitute an over-adjustment as the base case here is the UK remaining in the EU.  
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the future relationship between the UK and EU, it is consistent with a high degree 
of alignment between the UK and EU. Hantzsche et al. (2018) interpret the 
Withdrawal Agreement as including no tariffs, fees or quantitative restrictions on 
goods trade, and deep but not full regulatory alignment thereby leading to more 
trade frictions than EU membership. While there are no specific provisions for 
services in the Withdrawal Agreement, the Political Declaration looks for the EU 
and UK to conclude ‘ambitious, comprehensive and balanced arrangements on 
trade in services…’. Hantzsche et al. (2018), interpret this as implying more 
frictions than EU membership. It is also possible that Article 50 will be extended 
by some time to ensure that a deal can be agreed between the UK and EU that 
can be ratified in the UK parliament. While an extension of Article 50 may lead to 
some additional uncertainty in the short-run, the ultimate economic impact will 
be close to the Deal scenario considered in this paper.7, 8 The short-run effects of 
this scenario are more limited. In the No-Deal scenario, the UK exits the EU 
without a deal but the adjustment to the changed relationship between the UK 
and EU occurs in an orderly fashion. However, WTO tariff arrangements will apply 
to goods trade, there will be non-tariff measures, and services trade will also be 
negatively impacted. In the Disorderly No-Deal scenario, the UK exits the EU 
without a deal and there is an additional disruption to trade in the short-run. In 
each scenario, some of the negative trade impact is partially offset by FDI being 
diverted to Ireland.  
 
We adopt a two-step modelling approach to estimate the potential impact of 
Brexit on the Irish economy. In the first step, we apply shocks to the UK economy 
using the NiGEM global model of the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research to generate estimates of the impact of Brexit on the UK and the wider 
international economy. Several studies have used the NiGEM model in their 
analyses of the economic impact of Brexit (e.g. Ebell and Warren, 2016; Ebell et 
al., 2016; Hantzsche et al., 2018; HM Treasury, 2016; Kierzenkowski et al., 2016), 
as it is a multi-country model with explicit trade linkages that makes it very 
suitable for modelling the impacts of changes in trade policy. Then, in the second 
step, we incorporate these international impacts into COSMO, the ESRI’s model 
of the Irish economy,9 to gauge the impact on Ireland.10 We also incorporate the 
 
                                                          
 
7  This scenario assumes a relatively close ongoing relationship between the EU and UK. We have also considered a 
scenario whereby a deal is agreed but the eventual relationship between the UK and EU is less close.  
8  This, of course, assumes that following an extension of Article 50 a deal is agreed between the UK and EU that is 
ratified by the UK parliament. If, after an extension of Article 50, this does not happen it would imply reverting to a 
no-deal scenario. 
9  See Bergin et al. (2017a) for a full description of the mechanisms and behaviour of the model. In COSMO, sectors are 
defined based on the Supply and Use Input-Output Tables from the Central Statistics Office. A sector is defined as 
traded if at least 50 per cent of total final uses (excluding change in stocks) are exported. The aggregate government 
sector comprises those sectors in which at least 50 per cent of total final uses (excluding changes in stocks) are used 
by the government as consumption. The non-traded sector comprises the remaining sectors.  
10  Specifically, in COSMO the international economy is largely exogenous, reflecting the small open economy nature of 
Ireland, so we incorporate key international variables from NiGEM. These variables include interest rates, effective 
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likely impact of Brexit on FDI to Ireland using the same approach as Lawless and 
Morgenroth (2016). While the FDI effect is expected to have a positive effect on 
Ireland, the positive impact is outweighed by the negative trade effect. 
 
There is one main difference to the modelling approach adopted compared to 
our previous assessment of the impact of Brexit on Ireland (see Bergin et al., 
2017b) and to the Central Bank of Ireland (2019), and that is we calibrate our own 
estimate of the trade shock associated with Brexit. There is a consensus in the 
literature that the largest impacts of Brexit (on the UK, EU and Ireland) will be 
through the trade channel. The most common approach in macro-modelling 
exercises, to gauge the size of trade impacts, is to draw on estimates from gravity 
models. Here, we move away from gravity model based estimates where possible 
and draw on the recent micro-economic literature to calibrate potential trade 
shocks (described in detail in Section 3.3) which then incorporate into the NiGEM 
and COSMO models using the approach described above.  
3.2  The counterfactual scenario 
To capture the potential impact of Brexit, we compare the various Brexit 
scenarios to a counterfactual baseline where the UK remains a member of the 
EU. There is some evidence to suggest that the performance of the UK economy 
has already been affected by the decision to leave the EU, implying that overall 
UK growth has already fallen below where it otherwise would have been since 
the referendum. This is largely attributed to the impact of uncertainty on 
business investment decisions, the depreciation of Sterling and the downgrading 
of future growth prospects (see, for example, Born et al., 2018; Bloom et al., 
2018). NIESR construct a counterfactual scenario whereby, should the UK decide 
not to leave the EU, there would be some unwinding of these negative effects 
(Hantzsche et al., 2018). We import this international baseline into COSMO to 
generate a counterfactual baseline.  
3.3  Assumptions  
Trade 
NIESR (Hantzsche et al., 2018) construct various Brexit scenarios with detailed 
assumptions for the UK concerning reductions in trade, FDI, EU budget 
contributions, migration and productivity.11 Previous research suggests that the 
main economic impact of Brexit on most countries, and especially for extremely 
open economies such as Ireland, is likely to transmit through the trade channel. 
 
                                                          
 
exchange rates, oil prices, competitor prices, trade-weighted world demand (for Irish exports) and conditions in 
alternative labour markets. 
11  In the scenarios that follow, we implement alternative trade shocks in NiGEM, while keeping other UK assumptions 
the same as in Hantzsche et al. (2018). 
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Therefore, the assumptions made about the long-run change in UK-EU trade as a 
consequence of Brexit are crucial to assessing the impact of Brexit. NIESR 
(Hantzsche et al., 2018) draw on various estimates from the empirical literature 
based on gravity models (including Baier et al., 2008; Ebell, 2016; van der Marel 
and Sheperd, 2013; and Ceglowski, 2006) and assume in a no-deal scenario that 
the long-run reduction in UK-EU bilateral trade as a result of Brexit will be 56 per 
cent. They consider separate estimates for goods and services and take account 
of the share of goods and services in total UK-EU trade, which is 68.3 per cent and 
31.7 per cent, respectively (Hantzsche et al., 2018). This study employs a more 
direct approach to examining potential trade impacts of various Brexit scenarios 
by focussing on the imposition of tariffs and non-tariff measures.  
 
In a no-deal scenario, the UK is assumed to revert to trade under WTO most-
favoured-nation status after the UK leaves the EU at the end of March and so 
goods trade will be subject to tariff and non-tariff measures and services trade 
will be impacted by regulatory measures. We draw on several studies to calibrate 
each component of the shock and use these micro-founded estimates to 
generate an alternative trade shock.  
 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) examine detailed trade flows between the UK 
and all other EU members and match over 5,200 products to WTO tariff rates 
applicable to external EU trade. Their analysis accounts for differences in trade 
patterns across countries as well as differences in tariffs and in the 
responsiveness of demand for different products to price changes. They find a 
total reduction in UK-EU goods trade of 22 per cent with different impacts across 
countries. We use these estimates to calibrate a shock to goods trade. 
 
While Lawless (2018a) shows that there is a strong correlation between tariff and 
non-tariff measures, for our purposes we draw on the empirical literature to 
develop a micro-founded estimate of the potential impact of non-tariff measures 
on goods trade. We use Smith et al. (2018) estimates of non-tariff costs 
associated with the UK’s exit from the EU and combine them with the sectoral 
median trade elasticities obtained from Imbs and Mejean (2017)12 to derive Brexit 
related NTM impacts on goods trade.13,14 This is similar to the approach used by 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) to quantify tariff increases on goods trade. 
 
                                                          
 
12  Smith et al. (2018) define their sectors using classification GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project – product 
classification) while Imbs and Mejean (2017) define their sectors at the ISIC (International Standard Industrial 
Classification) two-digit level. In our analysis, both classifications are matched to six-digit HS (Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System) product export data taken from Comtrade using concordance tables from World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database of nomenclatures: wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html.  
13  The Smith et al. (2018) estimates of non-tariff costs associated with the UK’s exit from the EU are based on newly 
estimated product level ad valorem equivalent rates of a number of NTMs (Cadot et al., 2018). Smith et al. (2018) 
construct trade weighted costs of two types of NTM (i.e. sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers) 
faced by non-EU countries exporting into the EU which are then summed together to give a total NTMs cost. The 
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These estimates imply that UK-EU goods trade could be reduced by a further 31 
per cent (average impact across countries), around 1.4 times the effect 
associated with tariffs alone, bringing the total impact on UK-EU goods trade to 
around 53 per cent. In terms of the aggregate effect, this impact is substantial. It 
is also worth noting the variation in the impact on a country-by-country basis. 
This variation reflects in part differences in sectoral trade patterns (i.e. trade 
structure) between the UK and EU Member States which results in some 
countries being more exposed to larger NTM increases. As shown in Figure 1, UK 
exports to Cyprus, Austria and Italy would be relatively adversely affected by the 
implementation of the NTMs, with potential falls of 47, 42, and 40 per cent 
respectively. UK exports to Slovenia, Netherlands and Lithuania would be the 
least negatively affected. Interestingly, the NTM impact on UK exports to Ireland 
would be just below the EU average of 31 per cent.15 
 
FIGURE 1 IMPLIED UK-EU TRADE REDUCTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-TARIFF MEASURES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ Estimates. 
 
 
                                                          
 
increase in the non-tariff related costs associated with the UK’s exit from the EU to a WTO MFN arrangement is 
assumed to be half of the total NTM cost. This assumption is influenced by earlier research by Berden et al. (2013). 
which estimated that the potential reductions to NTMs from a transatlantic trade deal could be in the region of 50 
per cent. 
14  To undertake our assessment of the non-tariff measures implications for trade we assume that Brexit related NTM 
costs fully feed in to prices.  
15  We applied the same approach to assess the impacts of NTMs on Ireland’s trading activity with the UK. We find that 
applying the OECD’s assumed post-Brexit NTMs increases under a WTO type scenario (Smith et al., 2018) would 
reduce Irish exports to the UK by 28 per cent. In terms of the sectoral contributions, the Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products; Meats products; and Other processed foods sectors would experience the largest decreases, making up 60 
per cent of the overall decline. Irish imports from the UK would reduce by 24 per cent. The Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products; Motor vehicles and parts; Machinery and equipment n.e.c.; and Other foods sectors would see the largest 
reductions contributing approximately 60 per cent to the overall decline in Irish imports from the UK. 
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At a sectoral level, the size of the reduction in the share of UK exports would vary 
significantly. The sectors which would experience the largest falls in exports are 
Motor vehicles and parts; Chemical, rubber, plastic products; Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.; Wearing apparel; and Transport equipment n.e.c., contributing 
close to 80 per cent of the total decline in UK-EU exports. In general, the larger 
effect on these sectors can be explained as a combination of the level of their 
exports, with higher non-tariff measures and a relatively elastic sectoral price 
response.  
 
Turning to the potential Brexit impact on services trade, in terms of a no-deal 
scenario, reverting to WTO tariffs provides a reference point to base scenarios for 
goods, yet there is no comparable benchmark for the magnitude of trade impacts 
for services. Service trade restrictions are determined by non-tariff measures 
such as recognition of standards, permissions etc. which are harder to measure. 
Lawless (2018b) using a gravity model approach finds that EU membership has 
increased services trade by around 26 per cent.16 We use this estimate to 
calibrate a shock to services trade. 
 
Overall, the micro-based estimates for the reduction in goods trade including 
tariff and non-tariff measures and the estimate of the reduction in services trade 
imply a reduction of around 44 per cent in UK-EU trade in the long run, 
accounting for the share of goods and services in UK-EU trade. While this 
estimate is broadly consistent with NIESR’s (Hantzsche et al., 2018) assumption of 
a reduction in UK-EU trade of 56 per cent, it is roughly a quarter below the trade 
impact that they assume. We prefer this approach as it provides a more direct 
estimate of the potential impact on trade as a result of Brexit. We adopt this 
long-run trade assumption in our No-Deal and Disorderly No-Deal scenarios.  
 
NIESR consider two scenarios associated with a deal. In one scenario, which they 
describe as ‘Deal + Backstop’, they assume that total UK-EU trade will fall by 
around 30 per cent in the long run. They reduce, in particular, their estimate for 
the fall in goods trade, which they assume to be 25 per cent, as the backstop in 
the Withdrawal Agreement would keep the whole of the UK in a single customs 
territory with the EU and this will, on balance, have a much larger impact on 
goods trade. In the second scenario, which they describe as ‘Deal + FTA’ the long-
run impact on overall trade is assumed to be 46 per cent and, again, most of the 
adjustment is for goods trade, which they assume to fall by 40 per cent. As both 
 
                                                          
 
16  This estimate is considerably below that of Hantzche et al. (2018). Given the questionable assumption that is often 
incorporated in macro-models that the extra trade associated with EU membership (based on estimates from gravity 
models) would completely unwind as a result of Brexit, we prefer this lower estimate to calibrate a shock to services 
trade.  
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of these assumptions are based on estimates from gravity models, we use the 
lower bound estimate of 25 per cent for goods trade from the studies NIESR use 
to calibrate their goods trade shock. We leave our estimate for services trade 
unchanged from the No-Deal scenario so overall this implies a long-run average 
reduction in UK-EU trade of 24 per cent. As a sensitivity check, we also consider a 
scenario whereby the average long-run reduction in UK-EU trade is 30 per cent, 
around one-quarter higher than what we consider in our main Deal scenario. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment  
Our analysis of the macroeconomic impact of Brexit on the Irish economy 
includes the potential diversion of some FDI from the UK to Ireland. In aggregate 
terms, the UK is expected to lose around a quarter of its FDI inflows in the event 
of a No-Deal Brexit and 21 per cent in the case of a deal (see Ebell and Warren, 
2016, for a summary of the relevant literature). Ireland is already an attractive 
destination for FDI. In 2016, according to Eurostat, Ireland’s stock of FDI 
represented 5.6 per cent of the total stock of FDI of the EU, whereas the 
equivalent figures for GDP and population were 1.8 per cent and 0.9 per cent, 
respectively. Furthermore, Ireland and the UK share a number of similarities, in 
terms of economic structure, language and legal system etc. that make it 
reasonable to assume that Ireland could act as a competitive alternative 
destination for FDI. For example, Davies et al. (2016) find perceptions of Ireland 
and the UK as being similar in terms of alternative locations for FDI, in particular 
among non-EU investors and in the services sector. In this case, Ireland would be 
able to capture a significant portion of FDI spillovers from the UK relative to the 
size of the country.  
 
Our approach of estimating the FDI effect for Ireland follows closely with that of 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2016). The methodology is refined somewhat by 
estimating the potential losses for the UK and gains for Ireland at a sectoral level 
(NACE Rev. 2). We calculate sectoral FDI losses for the UK by combining sectoral 
data on UK FDI stocks and expected sectoral losses. We use the sectoral 
distribution of Ireland’s non-UK EU FDI stocks to determine the share of FDI 
inflows (from the UK or diverted from the UK) by sector. These sectoral gains are 
aggregated and converted to inflows of additional FDI in COSMO. 
 
The first step of this approach is to profile the current stock of FDI in the UK at 
the sectoral level and to evaluate which of these sectors would be more affected 
by Brexit. Figure 2 shows the sectoral shares of UK FDI and the expected losses in 
GVA by sector. The figure shows that FDI in the UK is heavily concentrated in 
Services, in particular Financial Intermediation, which represents approximately 
30 per cent of total FDI. Other services, which includes categories such as 
Communications, Professional Activities and Support Services, account for 16.7 
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per cent of the total. Other notable sectors include Food and beverages (10.7 per 
cent), Mining and quarrying (9.0 per cent), and Other manufacturing (6.5 per 
cent), which includes the manufacture of computers and other machinery. 
 
The impact of Brexit in the case of no deal is expected to vary by sector. We use 
the distribution of expected sectoral losses of gross value added (GVA) as weights 
to calculate the expected loss of sectoral FDI. Sectoral losses of GVA can be 
calculated based on the different price elasticities of the different sectors and the 
projected barriers to trade in a Brexit scenario, which in turn are used as an 
approximation for sectoral losses of FDI. Sectoral losses are calculated by 
aggregating the results of studies that have estimated sectoral impacts of a  
no-deal Brexit, including HM Government (2018), Felbermayr et al. (2018) and 
IMF (2018b). The results are shown in Figure 2. In percentage terms, the sectors 
with largest expected losses are Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, although both 
represent a small share of the UK’s FDI stock, followed by Financial 
Intermediation and the manufacture of Computers, electronic and optical 
products. We apply these implied sectoral losses to the total inward FDI 
reduction. In absolute terms, i.e. by multiplying the size of the stock of each 
sector’s FDI by its expected loss, the loss of FDI in the Financial Intermediation 
sector represents almost two-thirds of the total expected loss, due to its 
importance in terms of FDI and its large expected loss of GVA. Other sectors with 
large absolute losses are Computer and electronics, Chemicals, Information and 
communication, and Professional activities. 
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FIGURE 2 UK FDI SECTOR SHARE AND EXPECTED SECTOR LOSS OF GVA 
 
Sources:  FDI stocks from ONS and Eurostat and defined as the net stock of inward FDI from the rest of the world; Sectoral losses from 
International Monetary Fund (2018b); HM Government (2018); and Felbermayr et al. (2018). 
 
After evaluating the UK sectoral level FDI impacts, the next step is to check which 
sectors in Ireland are in the best position to attract some of this potential FDI 
from the UK. Our approach is to approximate the attractiveness of each Irish 
sector by their current share of non-UK EU (EU27) FDI stock. Sectoral Irish FDI 
data contain some non-standard aggregations because of confidentiality reasons, 
however we can make some inferences. Figure 3 shows the Irish share of the EU 
(non-UK) FDI stock. The figure shows that there are three sectors where Irish FDI 
represents more than a third of the total EU27 stock: Undisclosed manufacturing 
(including the manufacture of computer and electronic products), Manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, and Administrative and support activities (including aircraft 
leasing). Two other sectors represent a share of EU27 FDI of over 10 per cent: 
Professional activities (legal, accounting, consultancy and engineering activities), 
and Other manufacturing (including the manufacture of medical devices). 
 
With these shares acting as proxies for the attractiveness of various sectors with 
respect to FDI inflows, we can estimate how much inward FDI Ireland would be 
able to capture from the UK by multiplying the expected UK loss of FDI in every 
sector by the share of Irish EU27 FDI in that sector. This exercise shows that the 
potential largest gains would be in the Undisclosed manufacturing sector – mainly 
computer, electronic and optical products – a sector which combines a significant 
share of FDI in the UK, a large predicted loss in the UK, and a very high 
attractiveness to Ireland. The gains in this sector could amount to almost 40 per 
cent of the total predicted gain. Significant gains could also be achieved in the 
Financial Intermediation sector – despite the relatively low attractiveness of 
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Ireland in this sector – due to the size of the projected losses on the UK. Other 
sectors with potentially important gains include Professional activities, 
Administrative and support activities, Computer services, and Pharmaceuticals. In 
aggregate terms, the gain could amount to around €26 billion, which would 
represent an increase of 3.3 per cent over the current stock of Irish FDI and a 
capture of 7.6 per cent of the FDI spillovers from the UK following a no-deal 
Brexit. In the Deal scenario, the projected capture would imply an increase of 2.7 
per cent over the current FDI stock. 
 
FIGURE 3 IRISH SHARE OF EU27 (NON-UK) FDI STOCK, 2016  
 
 
Sources:  CSO and Eurostat. 
Notes: *Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (C24-25); Manufacture of 
computer, electronic and optical products (C26); Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (C28); Manufacture of motor 
vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and of other transport equipment (C29-30) 
** Manufacture of leather and related products (C15); Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (C23); Manufacture of 
electrical equipment (C27); Manufacture of furniture (C31); Other manufacturing (C32); Repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment (C33) 
*** Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A); Mining and quarrying (B); Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (D) 
**** Transportation and storage (H); Real estate activities (L). 
 
As in Lawless and Morgenroth (2016), we also assume that part of the exports 
associated to the activity of MNCs in the UK would reallocate to Ireland in a 
proportion similar to the captured FDI. This reallocation would produce an 
increase in Irish exports of 2.8 per cent above the baseline (2 per cent in the case 
of the Deal scenario), with a proportional increase in traded sector production 
because of the additional exports. Due to the uncertainty about the timing of the 
FDI relocation decisions, we simply assume that the increase in investment, 
exports and traded sector production is gradual, starting in 2019 in the No-Deal 
and Disorderly No-Deal scenarios and at the end of a transition period, in the Deal 
scenario. 
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Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Financial and insurance activities
Manufacture of food products; beverages and tobacco products
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Undisclosed - Other***
Undisclosed - Services****
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Finally, there are some elements in the FDI literature that suggest that this 
exercise should be considered as a best-case scenario. We have implicitly 
assumed that all FDI no longer destined for the UK in case of Brexit will remain in 
the EU, with Ireland capturing a share similar to its current share of EU27 FDI 
stock. Given that the EU economy is expected to experience a larger economic 
loss relative to the rest of the world as a result of Brexit, it may be the case that 
some of the FDI projects would actually leave the EU, as the EU’s market 
potential is reduced by comparatively more than its competitors. Similarly, the 
economic impact of Brexit is expected to be larger in Ireland than in the rest of 
the EU, so it may be the case that the attractiveness of the Irish economy to FDI 
would be reduced by relatively more than other EU countries due to the loss of 
market potential, so that Ireland may capture a smaller share of FDI than its 
current share. Blonigen et al. (2007) use spatial econometric techniques to 
estimate the importance of nearby third markets, such as the UK, through a 
measure of surrounding market potential. By accounting for proximity to other 
large markets, the study finds market potential to be highly influential in 
attracting FDI. In Ireland’s case, as the form of exit intensifies from a ‘soft’ to 
‘hard’, the domestic growth path could lower directly due to reduced UK demand 
and indirectly due to effectively poorer market potential in Ireland.  
 
Technical Assumptions 
The estimates from the empirical literature around the impacts on trade and FDI 
are generally based on static estimates of EU membership and so to a great 
extent apply to the long run (typically assumed to be around ten years after the 
UK leaves the EU). There is considerable uncertainty about the transition path to 
the long run. As such, we place a larger emphasis on the long-run impacts as 
these effects are anchored in estimates from the empirical literature. We broadly 
follow the approach of NIESR (Hantzsche et al., 2018) in determining short-run 
dynamics.  
 
In the No-Deal scenario, the trade shock is front-loaded with approximately half 
of the adjustment in trade taking place in 2019 with the remainder of the 
adjustment taking place over the period to 2028. In the long run, UK-EU trade is 
44 per cent below the counterfactual where the UK remains in the EU. The 3.3 
per cent increase in FDI inflows to Ireland is assumed to begin in 2019. 
 
In the Disorderly No-Deal scenario, we use our estimate of non-tariff measures to 
capture the fact that there could be an additional large disruption to trade 
especially in the short run. Specifically, we increase our estimate of non-tariff 
measures by a factor of three until the end of 2019 to capture this potential 
additional disruption. There are many channels through which a disorderly Brexit 
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could impact the economy (including consumer confidence, business investment 
decisions etc.); the mechanism we use here is additional trade disruption given 
the importance of trade in determining the overall impact of Brexit. We assume 
that this additional trade disruption is relatively short-lived so that by 2020 the 
impact on trade reverts to that in the No-Deal scenario. The assumptions on FDI 
are the same as in the No-Deal scenario.  
 
In the Deal scenario, the adjustment to the long-run trade impact is more 
gradual. We assume that an adjustment of 10 percentage points takes place by 
the end of the transition period (2020 Q4), with another 10 percentage points 
after the end of the transition period (2021 Q1), and trade adjusts gradually to 
the long-run impact thereafter. In the long run, UK-EU trade is 24 per cent below 
the counterfactual where the UK remains in the EU. In this scenario, the 2.7 per 
cent increase in FDI inflows to Ireland is introduced at the end of the transition 
period. 
IMPACT OF BREXIT ON IRELAND 
This section presents the results of our modelling of the projected impacts of the 
UK leaving the EU on the Irish economy, relative to a baseline scenario where the 
UK remains in the EU. Table 3 summarises the main results for key 
macroeconomic aggregates under the Deal, No-Deal, and Disorderly No-Deal 
scenarios across short-, medium- and long-term horizons. We emphasise the 
long-run impacts for Ireland as there is uncertainty about the timing associated 
with changes in the future relationship between the UK and EU. Overall, in each 
scenario, the level of Irish output is permanently below where it otherwise would 
have been were the UK to decide to remain in the EU. However, the negative 
impact on Irish output in the long run in the Deal scenario is approximately half 
that of the No-Deal scenario. 
 
There are two main channels through which the shock hits the Irish economy; the 
negative trade shock will serve to reduce economic activity below where it 
otherwise would have been while the positive FDI shock will help to partially 
offset some of the overall negative impact. Specifically, the trade shock arising 
from the imposition of tariff and non-tariff measures would lead to lower activity 
in the international economy and severely reduce the demand for Irish exports. It 
would also negatively affect Irish competitiveness on impact. However, we would 
expect some internal adjustment in the economy that would help to restore lost 
competitiveness over time.17 As a strong substitute for UK-destined investment, 
 
                                                          
 
17  The simulation results from NiGEM suggest that the Sterling-Euro exchange rate would depreciate by around 3.5, 5.5 
and 7.5 per cent in the short-run in the Deal, No-Deal and Disorderly No-Deal scenarios respectively. In the long-run, 
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the additional FDI that Ireland may attract would boost activity and labour 
productivity in the traded sector, which would positively impact wages and 
employment. In each of the Deal, No-Deal, and Disorderly No-Deal scenarios, the 
same channels and transmission mechanisms are at play but the magnitude and 
timing of the shocks differ and are smallest in the Deal scenario. 
 
In COSMO, output in the traded sector is driven by (trade weighted) world 
demand for Irish exports and competitiveness which means the shock is initially 
transmitted to the Irish economy through this sector. As described in Section 3.3, 
the phasing of the trade shock is front-loaded so, for example, in the No-Deal 
scenario global demand for Irish exports falls by 4.2 per cent compared to the 
baseline by the end of 2019 and by 7.6 per cent by the end of 2028. Overall, the 
shock leads to output in the traded sector and exports remaining below baseline 
values over the medium to long term. In the long run, output in the traded sector 
is 3.1, 5.9 and 6.1 per cent below baseline respectively in the Deal, No-Deal, and 
Disorderly No-Deal scenarios.  
 
Across the scenarios, while we would expect lower activity to depress prices, 
higher import prices lead to the level of consumer prices being above base, by 
around 0.5 per cent in the Deal scenario and 0.9 per cent in the No-Deal and 
Disorderly No-Deal scenarios.18 Table 3 also shows the equivalent impact on the 
inflation rate for particular years. The loss in competiveness as a result of Brexit 
would lead to pressure for some adjustment in prices in the economy. In 
particular, there would be downward pressure on wages to help improve 
competitiveness. In each scenario, there is a negative impact on real wages, with 
the strongest impacts in the Disorderly No-Deal scenario. The implied reaction of 
real wages is stronger than that of nominal wages because consumer prices are 
also above base in each scenario.  
 
The fall in traded sector output (relative to the baseline) results in lower labour 
demand, which has knock-on impacts for employment and the unemployment 
 
                                                          
 
in both the No-Deal and Disorderly No-Deal scenarios the depreciation in Sterling is closer to 7 per cent, while in the 
Deal scenario it is broadly similar to the short-run result. 
18  This impact is smaller than the results from Lawless and Morgenroth (2018), who report that the effect of the 
introduction of WTO tariffs and associated NTMs as a result of Brexit could raise the Consumer Price Index by 3.1 per 
cent. Two arguments help explain this divergence: firstly, COSMO is a general equilibrium model, in which a negative 
shock to the economy would depress activity and put downward pressure on prices. Secondly, as is mentioned in 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2018), their methodology does not take account of behavioural changes by consumers, the 
effect of exchange rate changes or the range of substitutes available, whereas the COSMO model can approximate 
some of these channels. However, it should be noted that if the availability of substitutes is limited, for example 
immediately after Brexit in the case of a disorderly exit, in the short term we could potentially observe movements of 
prices closer to those predicted by Lawless and Morgenroth (2018). Furthermore, if the reaction of prices were to be 
closer to the one described in Lawless and Morgenroth (2018), we would expect a stronger contraction of internal 
demand, incrementing the negative impact on GDP by between two- and three-tenths.  
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rate. In the long run, the unemployment rate is 1 percentage point higher in the 
Deal scenario and roughly 2 percentage points above baseline in the two no-deal 
scenarios. The increase in the unemployment rate over the long term is in part 
due to the increasing magnitude of the trade shock over time. As a result of the 
loosening in the labour market, average wages are lower than in the baseline 
scenario. This will reduce the incentive to work and have a negative effect on the 
participation rate and overall labour supply. The combination of lower 
employment and lower wages leads to lower real personal disposable income for 
households, and in turn reduces consumption and imports below their baseline 
levels. As a result of lower domestic demand, activity in the non-traded sector is 
also negatively impacted, although it takes some time for the effect of the shock 
to percolate through to the non-traded sector.  
 
With both output and employment below base in all three scenarios, government 
revenue from taxes will remain below base and the increase in the 
unemployment rate would lead to higher government spending on welfare 
payments. The net effect is a reduction in the general government balance (GGB). 
 
Overall in the long run, the level of GDP is 2.6 per cent,19 4.8 per cent and 5.0 per 
cent below where it otherwise would have been were the UK to remain in the EU. 
Although these are substantial relative reductions in the level of output over the 
long run, it is important to state that the Irish economy will continue to grow in 
each scenario but that the growth rate will be lower in the context of Brexit. If we 
assume the Irish economy would grow by an average of 3 per cent per annum 
over the long run if the UK stayed in the EU, the impact of Brexit is roughly 
equivalent to a 0.3 percentage point reduction in the long-run growth rate in the 
Deal scenario and around 0.6 percentage points off the long-run growth rate in 
the No-Deal and Disorderly No-Deal scenarios. The short-run impacts are below 
the long-run impacts in each scenario although they are still quite severe 
especially in the Disorderly No-Deal scenario where the additional disruption to 
trade leaves Irish output 2.4 per cent below where it otherwise would have been. 
  
 
                                                          
 
19  As a sensitivity check, we also consider a second deal scenario whereby the average long-run reduction in UK-EU 
trade is 30 per cent, around one-quarter higher that what we consider in our main Deal scenario. In this case, our 
simulation results show that the level of Irish GDP would be 3.4 per cent below the baseline in the long run. 
  
TABLE 3 IMPACT OF BREXIT ON IRELAND, CHANGE FROM BASELINE 
 
Short-Run (after 2 years)  Medium-Run (after 5 years)  Long-Run (after 10 years) 
 Deal No Deal  Disorderly  Deal No Deal  Disorderly  Deal No Deal  Disorderly 
Per cent deviation from Baseline Level:* 
   
        
GDP -0.6 -1.2 -2.4  -1.9 -2.7 -3.3  -2.6 -4.8 -5.0 
Gross Value Added -0.6 -1.3 -2.5  -2.0 -2.8 -3.4  -2.6 -4.9 -5.1 
GVA, Traded sector -0.9 -2.1 -3.9  -2.9 -3.9 -4.5  -3.1 -5.9 -6.1 
GVA, Non-traded sector -0.2 -0.2 -1.0  -1.1 -1.8 -2.4  -2.3 -4.2 -4.3 
Consumption -0.1 -0.2 -0.9  -0.9 -1.5 -2.1  -2.0 -3.5 -3.7 
Real personal disposable income -0.3 -0.6 -1.3  -1.2 -2.0 -2.5  -2.2 -3.9 -4.1 
Employment -0.1 -0.2 -0.8  -0.9 -1.4 -2.0  -1.8 -3.2 -3.4 
Labour force -0.1 -0.1 -0.3  -0.3 -0.5 -0.7  -0.7 -1.2 -1.2 
Average wages, nominal 0.0 -0.1 -0.3  -0.3 -0.2 -0.4  -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
Average wages, real -0.1 -0.3 -0.5  -0.5 -0.7 -0.9  -0.7 -1.3 -1.4 
Exports  -1.0 -2.7 -4.7  -3.6 -5.2 -5.9  -4.6 -8.1 -8.3 
Imports  -0.8 -1.7 -3.6  -3.1 -4.6 -5.5  -4.5 -8.0 -8.2 
Investment -0.7 -0.3 -2.0  -2.1 -3.6 -4.6  -4.1 -7.7 -7.8 
Personal consumption deflator, level 0.1 0.2 0.2  0.2 0.5 0.5  0.5 0.9 0.9 
Deviation from Baseline: 
   
        
Unemployment rate 0.1 0.1 0.5  0.5 0.9 1.2  1.0 1.9 2.0 
Participation rate 0.0 0.0 -0.2  -0.2 -0.4 -0.5  -0.5 -0.9 -1.0 
Personal consumption deflator, p.p. 0.0 0.0 0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1  0.0 0.1 0.1 
GDP deflator, p.p. 0.0 0.1 0.2  0.0 -0.1 -0.1  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
General government balance, % GDP 0.0 -0.1 -0.3  -0.3 -0.4 -0.5  -0.5 -0.9 -0.9 
 
Note: * all impacts are in constant prices/real terms unless otherwise stated.
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Further considerations 
As COSMO is a three sector model, we cannot consider some aspects of Brexit 
that require a more granular analysis. For example, the results presented above 
do not explicitly model supply chain effects. Production processes in many 
sectors are increasingly fragmented across national boundaries, which leaves 
firms highly exposed to negative shocks between cross-border trade linkages. 
Brexit could have significant supply chain impacts that would interfere with 
critical portions of production processes, inhibiting the completion of final 
products. Vandenbussche et al. (2019) account for global value chain linkages 
across industries as a key feature of a more detailed trade channel analysis. 
Under a hard Brexit scenario, they find that GDP in Ireland could decline by 5.7 
per cent relative to a situation of continued UK membership. This estimate is 
stronger, representing how import frictions could have a compounding effect on 
exporting ability, but remains broadly in line with the estimates presented in the 
No-Deal scenario above.  
 
In addition, this study cannot capture the heterogeneous effect of Brexit at a 
detailed sectoral level nor by firm size. Using a partial equilibrium approach, 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) and Department of Finance (2018a; 2018b) 
analyse the impact of Brexit at a more disaggregated sectoral level and find that 
some sectors, such as agri-food, would be relatively more affected, given both 
the expected large increase in trade barriers in these sectors and their relatively 
greater exposure to the UK market. Firms in these sectors, on average, are more 
likely to be Irish-owned and more labour intensive. Consequently, the negative 
effects from Brexit could fall disproportionally on Irish-owned firms meaning our 
analysis could underestimate the loss of employment. Furthermore, Lawless 
(2010) shows how NTMs tend to have a larger effect on smaller firms across all 
sectors. While our analysis does not include a regional distribution of the 
negative impact of Brexit, recent literature would suggest that regions with a 
relatively large proportion of small, Irish-owned firms operating in certain sectors 
such as agriculture or food production to be hit harder as a result of Brexit. 
Department of Finance (2017) finds that the Border and South-West regions to be 
particularly vulnerable to the negative impact of Brexit. 
 
Furthermore, it is possible that Brexit could divert future EU migration to other 
EU countries that would otherwise have gone to the UK and it is reasonable to 
assume that Ireland would experience higher immigration as a result. While our 
modelled scenarios will result in net immigration being below where it otherwise 
would have been because of lower economic activity and higher unemployment 
in Ireland, it is possible that some of this impact will be mitigated by the potential 
diversion of future EU migrants to Ireland and other EU countries. Barrett et al. 
(2015) argue that migration can be part of a process of investment in human  
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capital. Good English language skills are a valuable form of human capital and this 
factor combined with Ireland’s relatively favourable growth prospects (even in 
the context of Brexit) may mean that potential EU migrants will be willing to 
move to Ireland in the future if they are no longer able to go to the UK. However, 
it is difficult to quantify the potential magnitude of this effect with any certainty.  
 
Finally, our analysis assumes no reaction on the part of firms or government that 
could help to mitigate some of the economic impact of Brexit. As a result, the 
scenarios presented here could provide an overestimate of the potential impact 
of Brexit. For example, firms may be able to find substitutes for imports from the 
UK or diversify into new export markets which could help to reduce some of the 
losses associated with Brexit. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The UK is deeply integrated with the European Union and its decision to exit from 
this trading block has no parallels in modern history. From a macroeconomic 
modelling perspective this adds to the challenge (or at least the uncertainty, 
particularly in the short run) of estimating the macroeconomic implications of any 
future UK arrangement with the EU Member States including Ireland, as there is 
no past experience or empirical evidence which can be directly relied upon. 
However, to the extent that the main potential transmission channels are well 
understood there is a growing number of papers which have modelled the impact 
of Brexit. This Article adds to this literature by attempting to quantify the 
potential economic impact of Brexit on the Irish economy. 
 
International evidence suggests that the impact of Brexit on the UK economy 
could be substantial given its strong inter-linkages with the European and global 
economy. There is also evidence to show that Ireland could be relatively more 
negatively affected than other EU countries, because of the openness of the 
economy and the fact that the UK is its closest economic partner. The potential 
impact of Brexit on Ireland will ultimately depend on the UK’s new relationship 
with the EU. However, there is still considerable uncertainty around the likely 
form that this future relationship will take. As a result, we consider several 
scenarios to cover a broad range of possible outcomes. We consider three 
scenarios which we label Deal, No-Deal and Disorderly No-Deal.  
 
Even if the new relationship between the UK and EU is known, there is still 
uncertainty about the economic impact of Brexit. It is generally accepted that the 
main channels through which Ireland will be impacted are trade, including the 
impact of tariff and non-tariff measures, and FDI; however the precise scale of 
the impacts and their duration is largely unknown. In this Article we draw on the 
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new extensive Brexit literature to help calibrate these impacts and then 
incorporate them into a macro-modelling exercise to see how these changes feed 
through the economy. Our approach is different to others in that we combine the 
latest micro-level estimates (including new estimates of the impact of non-tariff 
measures) with macro-level analysis. Our scenario results show that the impacts 
on the Irish economy are large and Brexit will ultimately negatively impact firms, 
households, the labour market and the public finances. Overall, across the three 
scenarios, the fall in the level of Irish output below where it otherwise would 
have been ranges from 2.6 to 5.0 per cent in the long run, depending on the 
scenario considered. The short-run impacts are also severe and especially so in 
the context of a disorderly Brexit, where we assume there would be additional 
disruption to trade. 
 
There are both upside and downside risks to these estimates. On the upside, to 
the extent that businesses have been preparing for Brexit and finding ways of 
reducing trade exposures, this will help offset some of the negative impact. On 
the downside, the impact of Brexit could be more severe, especially in the short 
run, if there is a continued period of uncertainty which could impact investment 
decisions or if there are even larger disruptions to trade. 
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EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF MONETARY POLICY 
NORMALISATION FOR IRISH MORTGAGE ARREARS1 
 
Mike Fahy, Kieran McQuinn, Conor O’Toole, Rachel Slaymaker* 
ABSTRACT 
The current level of the monetary policy rate in the Eurozone is low both by 
international and historical standards and will likely rise over the coming years. In 
this Article we consider what the impact of a rise in ECB policy rates would mean 
for the Irish mortgage market. First, we examine the structure of the Irish 
mortgage market in terms of interest rate contract types and explore the link 
between the mortgage rate and the policy rate. Second, we draw out the results 
of policy modelling linking arrears and interest rates using a model put forward in 
Slaymaker et al. (2019). We then use this model to provide some further 
scenarios exploring the impact of interest rate rises on the arrears rate for 
particular groups of Irish households. Our findings suggest a 25 basis point 
increase in the policy rate would lead to a 0.1 percentage point increase in new 
missed mortgage payments. While households are in a better economic position 
to withstand policy rate increases given the recovery in the labour market and in 
house prices, rate rises would lead to payments rising faster than long-term 
income growth. Younger, lower income households who are at an earlier stage in 
their mortgage contract are more at risk, as are households on tracker interest 
rates who have a contractual pass-through from the policy rate to the lending 
rate.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the Irish mortgage market has 
gone through a period of considerable upheaval. At the peak of the crisis, one-in-
five mortgage loans were in arrears as households were confronted with 
simultaneous shocks in the labour market and to house prices. High origination 
loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios, as well as an over-extension of credit to 
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low income households meant few buffers were available to absorb the 
macroeconomic downturn  which transpired after 2008 (McCarthy and McQuinn, 
2017; Lydon and McCann, 2017). 
 
As the domestic economy continued to deteriorate, real earnings fell and 
unemployment rose strongly. Few policy levers were available to offset the 
decline in the economy given the requirement to follow a pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
adjustment under the economic support programme with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). One policy lever that did provide a countervailing force was the decline in 
the monetary policy rate which was part of a broader package of aggressive 
monetary policy actions by the ECB and other global Central Banks to offset the 
financial and sovereign debt crises (Gerlach, 2013).  
 
For a highly indebted economy like Ireland, reductions in the ECB policy rate are 
beneficial from a financial stability perspective if they reduce the debt repayment 
burden for borrowers. While not all mortgage holders in Ireland benefited from 
lower policy rates due to a breakdown in interest rate pass-through, certain 
cohorts such as tracker rate contract holders saw their repayments decline 
automatically. This helped provide a buffer to absorb some of the negative 
economic shocks. Byrne et al. (2017) find that monetary policy rate pass-through 
in Ireland led to a lower default rate amongst tracker borrowers than would 
otherwise be the case.   
 
Since 2013 the Irish economy has recovered, house prices have rebounded 
dramatically and unemployment has fallen to just under 6 per cent. The 
significant turnaround in economic fortunes has provided a supportive context 
for improvements in the mortgage market with the share of mortgage loans in 
arrears falling to just under 7 per cent in the first half of 2018 (Central Bank of 
Ireland, 2018). An extensive programme of mortgage modification has also 
played a role in reducing the share of mortgages in arrears (McCann, 2017; 
Donnery et al., 2018).  
 
More recently, European economies have begun to recover, with inflation now 
increasing towards the ECB target of 2 per cent or below. With the gradual 
withdrawal of extraordinary monetary policy measures already underway, and 
the US Federal Reserve and Bank of England raising policy rates, it is likely the ECB 
will begin to gradually move the policy rate back up to a more ‘normalised’ level if 
economic conditions allow. Such a rise in rates would inevitably have a 
considerable impact on the repayment capacity of Irish borrowers and their 
ability to service debt obligations in the mortgage market.  
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To consider what the impact of a rise in ECB policy rates would mean for the Irish 
mortgage market, the aims of this Special Article are threefold. First, we consider 
the structure of the Irish mortgage market in terms of interest rate contract types 
and explore the link between the mortgage rate and the policy rate. Second, we 
draw out the results of policy modelling linking arrears and interest rates using a 
model put forward in Slaymaker et al. (2019). We use this model to provide some 
further scenarios exploring the impact of interest rate rises on whether or not 
Irish households would miss a mortgage payment due to financial distress if 
interest rates were to rise. Our indicator of missed mortgage payments is broader 
than the strict 90 days past due definition that is used by the Central Bank for 
reporting and monitoring purposes. Instead, it captures those households who 
miss any payments due to financial distress. The model documented in Slaymaker 
et al. (2019) links mortgage arrears to changes in the actual monthly repayment-
to-net income level of the household. This provides a direct measurement of the 
effect of interest rate rises on the affordability of payments for each household. 
Finally, we discuss the implications for policy.  
 
A number of findings emerge. As outlined in Slaymaker et al. (2019), a 25 basis 
point increase in the monetary policy rate leads (within one year) to a 0.1 
percentage point increase in the flow of new missed mortgage payments based 
on 2016 data. As noted above, the measurement of arrears is not the standard 90 
days past due as measured by the official Basel definition, so the flow to new 90-
day arrears would therefore be lower than that provided by our estimates. As the 
effects of interest rates are non-linear (through the standard non-linear, 
repayment amortisation schedule), a larger adjustment of 100 basis points 
(similar to the 2018 US Federal Reserve adjustment) in the policy rate raises the 
flow of households into arrears by 0.5 percentage points.  
 
Given that the Irish economy is growing at a significant rate at present, it is useful 
to explore whether a rise in household incomes would offset any of the increase 
in the policy rate. To address this issue, Slaymaker et al. (2019) raise all 
household incomes by the long-run average income growth rate in the economy 
adjusted for the higher policy rate using COSMO (Bergin et al., 2017), a structural 
model of the Irish economy. They find that the rise in income does not offset the 
increase in repayments due to higher interest rates. This is because mortgage 
repayments, owing to the non-linear combination of income and interest rates, 
rise at a faster pace than income levels. However, this does not take into account 
a lower unemployment rate which would arise in an improved economy and is a 
critical determinant of mortgage default.  
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Finally, we use the model in Slaymaker et al. (2019) to explore the impact of a 50 
basis point rise in the policy rate on different groups of households namely: a) 
those on tracker versus standard variable (SVR) rates; b) young versus older 
households; c) low versus higher income borrowers; and d) loans with a longer 
term remaining versus loans closer to maturity. We find that younger, lower 
income households who are at an earlier stage in their mortgage contract are 
more at risk. In addition, tracker borrowers, who have a contractual pass-through 
from the policy rate to the lending rate, will inevitably face larger increases in 
their repayments compared to standard variable rate borrowers.   
 
Understanding the likely path of ECB interest rates over the coming years is 
complicated as it is affected by a range of factors. Such factors include the 
outlook for the European economy, European inflation, and broader 
developments in Europe around the balance of Central Bank policymaking power. 
The negative effects of Brexit again may delay normalisation. However, for a 
highly indebted economy like Ireland with a vulnerable mortgage market, it is 
prudent to plan for eventual rate rises and ensure buffers are available to absorb 
these at a household and bank level.  
 
The rest of this Article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the structure of 
the Irish mortgage market and discusses the link between lending rates and the 
policy rate. Section 3 presents the main findings in Slaymaker et al. (2019). 
Section 4 presents some additional scenarios and Section 5 draws out the 
implications for policy.  
2. STRUCTURE OF IRISH MORTGAGE MARKET AND INTEREST RATE RISK 
The degree to which policy rate increases are passed through to borrowers 
depends on two structural features of the mortgage market. First, the share of 
new loans and the outstanding stock that are on variable rate contracts 
determines the degree to which banks can pass through increases in their cost of 
funding to households. Second, pass-through from the policy rate to the lending 
rate which depends on a number of factors including the degree of competition, 
the cost of funds, credit risk, and the ability of households to refinance mortgages 
in the face of interest rate increases. In Section 2.1, we will document the first of 
these issues while discussing the second in Section 2.2. 
2.1 Interest rate types in the Irish mortgage market 
Loans in the Irish mortgage market are issued either on a fixed or variable rate 
basis, with the vast majority on the latter. There are two types of variable rate 
loans: those that track the ECB base rate at an agreed margin, typically called 
‘trackers’, and those that do not. In the case of the latter, the lender offers no 
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specific link to an underlying market or wholesale rate and can choose to increase 
or decrease the rate at its discretion. In this paper, when we refer to variable rate 
mortgages, we mean excluding trackers. The most common variable rate product 
is the Standard Variable Rate or ‘SVR’. 
 
Figure 1 panel A outlines the share of outstanding mortgage loan balances2  on 
standard variable rate, tracker rate, and fixed rate loans. It can be seen that in 
Ireland the market is currently dominated by variable rate contracts. As of Q2 
2018, by outstanding loan value (loan balances), 37 per cent of the balance of 
mortgage loans outstanding in Ireland have standard variable rate contracts, a 
further equal share of 37 per cent of the balance have tracker interest rates. A 
further 2.5 per cent of the balance have fixed rate loans of less than one-year 
fixation which is in essence a variable rate loan. In terms of longer-term fixed 
rates, 12 per cent of mortgage balances had a one- to three-year fixed rate, a 
further 9.5 per cent of balances had a three- to five-year fixed rate while a total 
of 2.5 per cent had a fixed rate greater than five years. This indicates that a total 
of 26 per cent of Irish mortgage balances have some type of rate fixation leaving 
approximately 74 per cent, or three-quarters of the balance of loans, at risk of 
rate changes if the ECB adjusts its policy rate. In terms of the number of loans, 
the Central Bank of Ireland Credit Market Report 2018, indicates that as of Q2 
2018, 21 per cent of fixed rate contracts were over one year maturity.3   
 
This reliance on variable rate contracts leaves the holders of these mortgages 
very exposed to increases in rates in the future. Indeed, the short-term nature of 
the fixed rate loans in the Irish market is also a cause for structural concern as, 
compared to markets such as the US or Denmark where mortgage fixation 
periods often last 30 years, all the fixed rate products in Ireland are short-term in 
duration. The longest fixed-term rate on the market in Ireland currently is ten 
years in duration.4 In comparison to other European countries, Ireland’s share of 
variable rate origination is higher than the median (See Figure 1, panel C). In 
2013, mortgage markets such as France and Belgium had fewer than 10 per cent 
of loans on variable contracts as compared to 85 per cent of loans in Ireland.  
 
                                                          
 
2  This refers to the proportion of the value of outstanding loans by interest rate type, not the proportion of the 
number of loans.  
3  https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/publications/household-credit-market-report/household-credit-
market-report-2018.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
4  Sibley, E. (2018) ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – 2018 and beyond’, Remarks delivered to the Institute of Banking 
Breakfast briefing ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – past, present and future’. 
106 |  Qua rt er ly  Econom ic  Comme n tar y  –  Sp r i n g  2 01 9   
 
FIGURE 1 OVERVIEW OF INTEREST RATE TYPES IN IRELAND AND EUROPEAN COMPARISON 
A. Share of Outstanding PDH Mortgage Loans by Interest Rate Type – Ireland 
 
 
B. Share of New Mortgage Lending by Interest Rate Type – Ireland 
 
 
C. Share of Variable Rate Loans Originated in 2013 – EU Comparison 
 
 
Sources:  A: Central Bank of Ireland, Private Household Credit Statistics Table A.18.1. 
B: Central Bank of Ireland, Retail Interest Rates Table B3.1.  
C: European Systemic Risk Board, Report on Residential Real Estate and Financial Stability in the EU, 2016. 
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The high share of interest rates on variable contracts heightens the risk 
associated with the mortgage market’s potential exposure to changes in the 
banks’ cost of funding through the policy rate. The difference in interest rate type 
has important implications from a modelling perspective when attempting to 
estimate the impacts of interest rate changes on households’ repayment 
capacity.  
 
For the Irish mortgage market, borrowers holding tracker rate contracts are a 
substantial source of vulnerability. These loans were originated at the height of 
the credit boom and the underlying loan sizes are larger than for other contracts. 
Kelly et al. (2015) show that, while tracker loans are larger, their median 
repayments have been lower than other contract types as they have benefited 
considerably from the low interest rate environment and the contractual margin 
between the policy rate and their mortgage rate. Byrne et al. (2017) further 
document that tracker borrowers have experienced much lower default rates as a 
result of the lower ECB policy rate. Naturally, as tracker borrowers have benefited 
from a fall in the policy rate, these loans will be immediately impacted when the 
policy rate begins to move.  
2.2 Interest rates and the link to monetary policy 
It has been well documented that mortgage interest rates in Ireland are high by 
European standards.5 Figure 2 plots the average interest rate in Ireland on 
outstanding mortgage loans relative to other European countries. From 2000 
onwards, Irish rates, mainly due to increased competition in the domestic 
market, were below the median in other countries; since 2014, Irish mortgage 
interest rates are now the highest of the group of countries for which data are 
available.  
 
 
                                                          
 
5  See ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2018; Central Bank of Ireland Influences on Standard Variable 
Rate Pricing in Ireland, 2016.  
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FIGURE 2 INTEREST RATES ON NEW HOUSE PURCHASE LOANS TO HOUSEHOLDS – EUROPEAN 
COMPARISON 
 
 
Sources:  Central Bank of Ireland, SME Credit Series, Table A.14.1. 
Notes:  Countries included are: AT, BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, NL, PT, SI. These countries are selected due to data availability. Data differ 
between this chart presented and the text as the ECB comparison data include restructured mortgages whereas the new 
business SVR is only for new drawdowns. 
 
Understanding the determinants of interest rates in Ireland is particularly 
important when considering the extent to which rates will be passed through to 
borrowers in the event of a monetary policy rate rise. The process of rate ‘pass-
through’ is an important structural feature of any mortgage market and is a 
critical channel in the functioning of monetary policy (Hofmann and Mizen, 2004; 
Karagiannis, 2010).  
 
The pass-through inevitably depends on the share of variable and fixed rate 
contracts in the market as discussed above. Having determined in Section 2.1 that 
Ireland is a market with predominantly variable rates, this transmission channel 
of monetary policy is particularly important. However, rate pass-through also 
depends on a multitude of other factors. A number of studies (including Goggin et 
al., 2012 and McQuinn and Morley, 2015) conclude that the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, i.e. the extent to which European policy rates influence 
domestic rates, has, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, broken down in the 
case of the Irish mortgage market. The reasons for this are primarily concerned 
with the many legacy issues arising in the Irish banking sector after the 
2007/2008 crash. Internationally, there is evidence of a weaker pass-through 
following the crisis. Illes et al. (2015) explore why bank lending rates did not fall 
as much as the decline in policy rates would have suggested following the crisis. 
They find this was due to the fact that the policy rate did not accurately reflect 
the cost of bank liabilities.  
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Figure 3 plots the Irish SVR, tracker rate and the ECB policy rate over time. As 
noted in Goggin et al. (2012), mortgage lenders in the Irish market tend to use 
the three-month Euribor as a benchmark for adjusting the pricing of variable rate 
mortgages. Euribor in general follows the ECB MRO (Main Refinancing Operations 
rate), as presented in Figure 3. Up to 2010, it is clear that Irish lenders tended to 
track the policy rate both for increases and decreases in the Euribor rate. 
However, since 2011, domestic policy rates have not fallen by as much as the 
decline in the Euribor would suggest. Goggin et al. (2012) contend that one 
reason for the divergence is that some Irish lenders are charging higher variable 
rates to compensate for the losses being made on their tracker loans given the 
relatively higher funding costs associated with these products. The interest rate 
on tracker loans has fallen in line with their contractual mark-up to the ECB base 
rate. Other structural factors such as market competition can also impact the 
degree of pass-through of the policy rate to mortgage rates. It is clear that 
competition in the Irish market declined in the aftermath of the financial crisis as 
a number of institutions left the Irish market.6 Other factors impacting the degree 
of pass-through can include the banks’ cost of funds and the credit risk of 
borrowers. Indeed, Illes et al. (2015) find the weighted cost of liabilities to be a 
good driver of bank lending margins since the crisis. The banks’ cost of funds is 
determined by their liability structure, for example the ability of the banks to 
access funding internationally as well as domestically through bonds, share 
issuance, interbank lending, and savings products (household and corporate). 
More recently, Sibley (2018) has focused on the low rate of repossessions in the 
Irish market and the inability of banks to repossess collateral which, in turn, 
undermines the link between lending and security. Sibley (2018) also notes that 
capital requirements and risk weighting, in an economy with high levels of legacy 
debts, and the subsequent provisions that must be held against mortgages, may 
also raise the cost of lending in Ireland.7  
 
 
                                                          
 
6  See Influences on Standard Variable Rate Pricing in Ireland – Central Bank of Ireland report.  
7  Ibid. and Sibley, E. (2018). ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – 2018 and beyond’. Remarks delivered to the Institute of 
Banking Breakfast briefing ‘The Irish Mortgage Market – past, present and future’.  
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FIGURE 3 STANDARD VARIABLE RATE, TRACKER RATE AND ECB MRO RATE 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Private Household Credit Statistics Table A.18.1. 
 
In more recent years, increased competition has occurred in the domestic market 
and a marginal decline in the standard variable rate can be seen. Of critical 
importance from our perspective is how increases in the policy rate would be 
passed through to borrowers on the ground and in turn how this would impact 
mortgage arrears. For tracker borrowers it is clear, these would face a contractual 
100 per cent pass-through. For standard variable rate holders, the degree of pass-
through is less clear. Goggin et al. (2012) found that the pass-through parameter 
to the standard variable rate in the period before the financial crisis was 0.6 per 
cent for every 1 per cent change in the policy rate. If this relationship was to 
continue, then any increase in the policy rate would represent a considerable rate 
increase for variable rate contracts.  
 
Taken together, the pass-through to Irish households on variable rate contracts 
(both tracker and standard variable) would certainly pose an additional risk in 
terms of their repayment capacity and inevitably lead to a heightened risk of 
arrears.   
3. POLICY RATE NORMALISATION AND ARREARS 
3.1 Sample, model and empirical approach 
In this section, we present a short overview of the methodology and analysis in 
Slaymaker et al. (2019) as context for understanding the impact of policy rate 
changes on mortgage arrears. The dataset used is the EU-SILC survey for Ireland 
which has been collected annually since 2003. The main aim of the survey is to 
collect information on poverty, household incomes and deprivation. However, 
critically for our purposes, the Irish SILC survey has a variable which captures the 
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level of the monthly mortgage payment. It also has information on the current 
loan balance outstanding, an estimate of the current house price, originating 
mortgage conditions (term and balance), current interest rate type and 
importantly whether or not the household missed a mortgage repayment due to 
financial difficulties. The interest rate on a loan-by-loan basis can be solved from 
an amortisation formula given the originating balance, term and current 
payment. The data do not capture mortgage equity releases or top-ups so these 
estimates may underestimate the overall effects of rate rises for households with 
these products. SILC is an annual survey so all variables are measured in annual 
terms.  
 
The dataset also has a four-year rotating panel with each household remaining in 
the sample for a maximum of four years. This provides a rich source of within-
household variation in key variables over time. For brevity, we do not go into 
detail in this Article on the specifics of the sample. However, these can be found 
in Fahy et al. (2018) and Slaymaker et al. (2019). 
 
The combination of current information on income and mortgage payments as 
well as an arrears flag is relatively unique and is not available in many loan-level 
datasets available in Ireland, Europe and the US which are used for official stress 
testing purposes. Having this information allows us to calculate a current debt 
service ratio as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐷𝑆𝑅) =  (
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
) 
 
This current debt service ratio can then be included as a covariate explaining 
arrears. A noteworthy distinction between SILC and the official Central Bank 
measure of mortgage arrears is important at this juncture. In SILC, mortgage 
arrears are measured using responses to the following question:  
In the last 12 months, did it happen that the household was unable to 
make a mortgage repayment for the main dwelling on time, due to 
financial difficulties? 
 
The Central Bank mortgage arrears data use a more standard Basel definition of 
mortgage arrears which is 90 days past due. Our measure is therefore a looser 
indicator and could capture households who are early in the arrears process, 
even those who are only a very small number of days past due.  
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The model and empirical findings 
To test the impact of the debt service ratio on arrears, Slaymaker et al. (2019) use 
a standard discrete time logit survival model to estimate the probability of 
mortgage arrears as a function of the change in the debt service ratio (DSR) to 
capture payment or income shocks, the lagged level of the DSR to capture 
indebtedness and repayment capacity, the level of the current loan-to-value 
(CLTV) ratio, the log of lagged income, employment status, loan vintage, regional 
macroeconomic controls and other household controls.   
Pr(𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(∆𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐿𝑇𝑉𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡−1,𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑍𝑟𝑡−1, 𝑡) 
 
Table 1 shows the importance of both the lagged level of the DSR capturing 
repayment capacity and the change in the DSR capturing payment and income 
changes as determinants of households falling into mortgage arrears. It also 
demonstrates that the parameters on these two key determinants of mortgage 
arrears have changed over time. We therefore focus on the post-crisis period 
2010-2016 only in the following scenario analysis to ensure that the parameters 
provide the most accurate predictions.  
TABLE 1  EMPIRICAL MODEL ESTIMATES 
 Full Sample Post-Crisis Only 
L.DSR 
0.100*** 
(0.0387) 
0.130** 
(0.0606) 
ΔDSR 
0.122*** 
(0.0475) 
0.239*** 
(0.0700) 
CLTV Y Y 
Employment Status Y Y 
Income Y Y 
Household Characteristics Y Y 
Regional Macro Controls Y Y 
Loan Vintage Y Y 
Observations 4,239 2,439 
 
Source: ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
Notes:  Household characteristics include; age, marital status, education, household composition and NUTS3 region. Full sample 
refers to 2004-2016, while post-crisis sample refers to 2010-2016.  
3.2 Scenario analysis 
In Slaymaker et al. (2019) we use the model discussed in the previous section to 
first calculate a baseline predicted probability of falling into arrears for each 
borrower. We then conduct an interest rate shock scenario by allowing for a 
different pass-through relationship according to the interest rate type for each 
household. A new instalment is then calculated using an amortisation formula. 
The payment for each scenario is then a function of the shocked interest rate, the 
borrower’s mortgage term, and the original loan amount. Once the new payment 
has been calculated, we then recalculate the debt service ratio which is fed into 
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the model to calculate a new predicted probability of falling into arrears for each 
household. We then take the mean predicted probability of falling into arrears 
across all households in each year and compare to the mean baseline figure to 
quantify the increase in the average predicted probability of falling into arrears.  
 
Given the uncertainty over the likely magnitude of future policy rate rises, we 
examine the impact of a range of interest rate shocks from a small 25 to a larger 
100 basis point rise. In a speech to the ECB Forum on Central Banking in June 
2018, Mario Draghi stated that the ECB ‘will remain patient in determining the 
timing of the first rate rise and will take a gradual approach to adjusting policy 
thereafter’. We therefore begin with a 25 basis point shock. As our model is 
annual and looks at the one-year impacts of an interest rate rise, it is plausible 
that we could see a number of smaller quarterly rises totalling a larger annual 
increase such as 50 or 100 basis points. At the more severe end of the scale, the 
2018 EBA banking stress test adverse scenario for the Irish long-term rate has an 
increase of 150 basis points; while McCann (2017) implements a 200 basis point 
shock on tracker loans in work using loan-level data. From the perspective of our 
static one-year model, we feel that increases of these magnitudes are not 
realistic within a calendar year and instead undertake three shocks 25, 50 and 
100 basis points.  
 
Figure 4 plots the percentage point increase in the predicted probability of 
households falling into arrears under the interest rate shock scenarios ranging 
from 25 to 100 basis points. In 2016, a 25 basis point rise in the policy rate 
increases the flow of households falling into arrears by 0.1 percentage points, a 
50 basis point rise leads to a 0.2 percentage point increase and a larger 100 basis 
point increase leads to just under a 0.5 percentage point increase in the flow of 
households into arrears.   
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FIGURE 4  DEVIATIONS FROM BASELINE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS UNDER INTEREST 
RATE SHOCK 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
Looking more closely at the mechanism through which this occurs, Figure 5 
illustrates how both monthly mortgage instalments and the debt service ratio 
increase in the event of an interest rate shock. A 50 basis point rise increases the 
mean payment by €100 per month and increases the DSR from 18.2 to 20.2 per 
cent.  
 
FIGURE 5  MONTHLY INSTALMENTS AND DEBT SERVICE RATIO UNDER INTEREST RATE SHOCK 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
2014 2015 2016
C
h
an
ge
 in
 A
rr
ea
rs
 (
P
P
)
25bps 50bps 100bps
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
Baseline 25 50 100
D
SR
 (
%
)
M
o
n
th
ly
 In
st
al
m
en
t 
(€
)
Interest Rate Shock (bps)
Payment DSR
Quar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  Spr in g  201 9  |  11 5  
 
Given the recent rapid growth of the Irish economy, it is useful to explore 
whether an increase in household income could offset any of the increase in the 
arrears rate caused by an increase in the policy rate. To address this issue, 
Slaymaker et al. (2019) raise all household incomes by the long-run average 
growth rate in the economy, adjusted for the sensitivity of income to the higher 
policy rate using COSMO, the Core Structural Model of the Irish Economy (see 
Bergin et al., 2017). Figure 6 shows that the increase in the arrears rate is lower in 
the scenario with rising incomes as households have more buffers to withstand 
shocks.  However, rising incomes do not fully offset the rise in repayments due to 
increases in the policy rate. This is due to the non-linear nature of mortgage 
interest rate increases.8  This non-linearity is clearer in relation to tracker 
borrowers as illustrated in Figure 7 as these mortgage holders are more exposed 
to interest rate rises (through a greater pass-through of monetary policy).  
 
FIGURE 6  EFFECTS OF INTEREST RATE SHOCK ON MORTGAGE ARREARS UNDER RISING INCOMES 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  See McQuinn and O’Reilly (2008) for more on the sensitivity of mortgage repayments due to the non-linear 
combination of income levels and interest rates. 
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FIGURE 7  INSTALMENT AND INCOME CHANGES UNDER INTEREST RATE SHOCK WITH RISING 
INCOMES 
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
It should be noted that raising incomes for all households is only one channel 
through which risks would be mitigated. Often households that go into arrears 
would suffer catastrophic economic circumstances such as unemployment, which 
would lead to a much larger change in incomes than the standard annual rise 
posited here. Therefore in a growing economy, as employment increases, this 
would naturally increase income more than the standard factor increased here. 
As the unemployment rate has declined rapidly in Ireland in recent years, it is 
likely that further employment growth would help boost households’ ability to 
manage their mortgage payments and also lead to a smaller increase in the 
arrears rate than the simple exercise that we calculate here. More generally it is 
important to note that the most recent data we are able to use for this analysis 
are for 2016. As the economy has continued to improve into 2017 and 2018, 
accompanied by a falling arrears rate, it is likely that Irish households would in 
fact currently be better placed to absorb an interest rate rise. The results from 
this analysis can therefore be thought of as an upper bound of the likely true 
effect.   
 
Another channel which may help to moderate the increase in cases of arrears in a 
growing economy is rising house prices. One of the key features of the mortgage 
arrears crisis in Ireland was the extent to which short-term arrears cases 
transitioned into longer-term arrears due to many of these households being in 
negative equity, leaving them with little option but to remain in their property 
and fall deeper into arrears. As house prices have rebounded strongly in recent 
years, this naturally lowers the impact of negative equity on arrears and may 
lower the increase in arrears due to a policy rate rise.  
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In the scenario analysis presented here we deploy a range of interest rate 
increases from 25 to 100 basis points and test the impact on the likelihood of 
arrears over a one-year horizon. However, at this juncture, it is informative to 
reflect on what might the path of normalisation look like when the ECB does 
begin to raise the policy rate. In this context it is useful to consider how other 
Central Banks have historically changed rates as an indicator of the ECB’s path. 
Figure 8 presents the policy rates of selected global Central Banks including the 
ECB, US Federal Reserve and Bank of England. It can be seen that policy rates are 
at a historic low since the aggressive loosening following the financial crisis. The 
Federal Reserve and Bank of Canada have begun a policy of unwinding low rates 
on the back of stronger economic fundamentals and rising prices in these 
economies. Both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada undertook 
between 25 basis points and 75 basis points increases per annum from 2015-
2018. If the ECB was to follow a similar policy it would mean the annual increases 
of between 25 and 50 basis points are more likely in the short run.  
 
FIGURE 8  POLICY RATES OF SELECTED GLOBAL CENTRAL BANKS 1990-2017  
 
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC. 
 
However, historically, the ECB has acted aggressively, with a 125 basis points rise 
in the year between Q1 2006 and Q1 2007. Going forward, how they react will 
depend on the strength of inflation in the Eurozone economy and, ultimately, the 
magnitude of the European economic recovery. However, on balance, it is 
unlikely that any more than a 100 basis points rise within a calendar year would 
be undertaken without a significant increase in price levels. In this context, our 
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100 basis points shock is, arguably, the largest increase that would occur within a 
calendar year in a recovering European economy.  
 
Another point is noteworthy. The research works on a ceteris paribus basis 
holding all other factors constant. Households could, as an alternative, approach 
the bank for a temporary restructure to avoid a technical default and we do not 
take this into account. The household may also be able to delve into savings or 
other wealth to avoid payment and we cannot model this. 
4. ARE PARTICULAR GROUPS MORE EXPOSED? 
In this section we explore the impact of interest rate rises on the flow of 
households falling into arrears for particular groups of Irish households. To do 
this we calculate the predicted probabilities of falling into arrears for a 50 basis 
point shock by interest rate type, loan vintage, household age and disposable 
income.  
 
Figure 9 presents the predicted probability of new arrears flows for households 
with tracker and SVR mortgage rates (top two panels), and the corresponding 
percentage point difference between the initial baseline and 50 basis point 
interest rate shock scenario (bottom two panels). It must be noted that while the 
SILC survey gives a good representation of the mortgage market in general, it may 
under- or over-represent the sample for each specific rate type as the survey 
does not stratify by these criteria. These results must be interpreted with this 
caveat.  
 
In 2016 the baseline predicted rate of new arrears cases is similar for tracker and 
SVR households. However, the bottom two panels show that tracker borrowers, 
who have a contractual pass-through from the policy rate to the lending rate, will 
inevitably face higher repayments when interest rates rise. A 50 basis point rise 
leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in the flows of new arrears for borrowers 
with tracker mortgages, compared to a 0.2 percentage point increase for those 
households with SVRs.  
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FIGURE 9  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
RATE TYPE 
 
  
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
 
Figure 10 examines the differing impacts of a policy rate rise by loan vintage, 
defined as years since mortgage origination. In 2016 younger vintage loans (less 
than ten years) actually have a lower probability of falling into arrears. However, 
these households are generally slightly more vulnerable to an increase in the 
policy rate compared to those with older vintage loans. Drawing any firm 
conclusions looking at the effects across loan vintage is complicated due to the 
number of loans issued under loose credit conditions in the early to mid-2000s. 
 
Another potentially vulnerable group of households are younger mortgage 
holders at the beginning of their income life cycle. In Figure 11 we show that not 
only do younger households (aged less than 35 years) have a higher likelihood of 
falling into arrears, they also face a larger increase in their probability of falling 
into arrears as a result of an interest rate shock. 
 
Finally, turning to income, Figure 12 illustrates that households outside the top 
quartile of the income distribution have a higher likelihood of falling into arrears, 
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and they also face a larger increase in their probability of falling into arrears as a 
result of an interest rate shock. 
 
FIGURE 10  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
LOAN VINTAGE  
 
   
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
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FIGURE 11  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
AGE 
  
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
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FIGURE 12  PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF ARREARS FLOWS UNDER 50BPS INTEREST RATE SHOCK BY 
INCOME 
  
  
 
Source:  ESRI and Department of Finance analysis of EU-SILC.  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A number of policy implications arise from our research. The current level of the 
monetary policy rate in the Eurozone is low both by international and historical 
standards and will inevitably rise over the coming years. It is clear that interest 
rate normalisation poses a risk to many Irish households given high levels of 
indebtedness and the variable nature of interest rate contracts; an economy with 
a high share of variable rate contracts is particularly exposed to considerable 
interest rate risk (Leece, 2000). Our findings show that any increase in the policy 
rate would be somewhat offset by expected household income growth. The 
improved economic circumstances in Ireland in the past couple of years, in 
particular the fall in unemployment and recovery in house prices, does leave 
households in a better position to manage any increase in interest rates.  
 
The results point to specific households being more vulnerable to any interest 
rate rises. We find that tracker borrowers, who have a contractual pass-through 
from the policy rate to the lending rate, will inevitably face higher repayments. As 
the rates for these borrowers are still well below those for other contract types 
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(fixed or variable), it would require a steep rise in rates to make it beneficial for 
these households to switch rate type or to fix. Therefore until such time as 
tracker rates move towards fixed rates, fixation would not be optimal for these 
borrowers. For such households, if they have spare financial resources, steps to 
redeem part of the balance through increased payments would help to reduce 
indebtedness. However, this will not be possible for households without 
sufficient resources.   
 
We also find that younger, lower income households who are earlier into their 
mortgage contract are more at risk. Given the expected upward path of interest 
rates, encouraging such households to contract longer-term fixed interest rates 
would ensure these borrowers would be protected from future rate volatility. At 
present, only two banks offer fixed-rate mortgage products of ten years, and no 
provider offers fixed rates for the duration of the term (as would be standard in 
many other countries). From a market structure policy perspective, steps to move 
towards the introduction of longer-term fixed rate loans in the Irish market would 
be advantageous for two reasons.9  
 
From a household demand perspective, the option to fix for longer-term horizons 
would allow them to balance repayment risks with other factors such as income 
volatility. The use of longer-term fixed rate mortgage loans in the Irish market 
could also benefit households, by increasing transparency and stability for 
borrowers (CCPC, 2017). However, it is important to note that while in the short 
to medium term, rate fixation may be desirable for certain households given the 
expected upward path of interest rates, long-term fixed rates do remove 
flexibility and the ability of a borrower to potentially benefit from any fall in 
interest rates during an economic downturn. It has been well established that 
factors such as financial literacy, risk preference and interest rate expectations all 
feed into households’ choice of mortgage contract (Devine et al., mimeo). 
Information, increased awareness of the different loan options available in the 
market, and educational programmes that improve households’ understanding of 
complex choices would likely lead to a more optimal choice of interest rates.  
 
From the supply-side perspective of the financial sector, mortgage providers 
themselves would benefit from offering longer-term fixed rates if it reduced the 
likelihood of default and allowed financial institutions to better match the cost of 
liabilities with the return on assets.  
 
 
                                                          
 
9  Similar conclusions for the UK market are presented in the Miles (2004) report. The Rebuilding Ireland Home Loan 
introduced to the market recently provides 30-year fixed rate mortgages at a 2 per cent rate. 
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For some households who are exposed to interest rate increases, fixing may not 
be possible either due to financial circumstances or the fact that they continue to 
hold tracker rates which are lower than the current market-provided fixed rate 
options. In these circumstances, providing sufficient and timely information to 
households of the likely changes to payments when rates rise would be useful 
and allow them to plan accordingly. 
 
Finally, policies to prevent any future build-up of vulnerabilities through the 
excess supply of mortgage credit at the household level must remain an 
accepted, long-term feature of the Irish market. In particular, the loan-to-income 
restriction introduced in January 2015 as part of the Central Bank’s macro-
prudential mortgage market measures is a vital part of the financial stability 
architecture. The use of guidelines on interest rate stress testing by the banking 
sector on loan applications such as the 2 per cent stress test on short-term 
fixation and variable products in the Consumer Protection Code are important to 
limit any loosening of bank credit conditions outside the current macroprudential 
framework.   
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